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I. INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding academic freedom's venerable and near-sacrosanct
place among academicians in the United States today,' the Supreme
Court first accorded it constitutional status only in the 1950s. The Court
did not recognize First Amendment speech rights of public employees
generally until 1968. In subsequent years, the Court evolved two sep-
arate lines of cases: the one relating to, and generally protective of,
academic freedom in public colleges and universities; the other, relating
to the speech rights of public school teachers and public employees in
other work contexts. The Supreme Court has yet to address the question
whether the severely restrictive standards developed in the second line
of cases must also apply to academic free speech.
Recently, in Harleston v. Jeffries,2 the Court vacated a Second Circuit
decision upholding the district court's determination that City College
of New York officials had violated a black faculty member's First
Amendment speech right by removing him from his chairmanship in
retaliation for remarks he had made in a speech off-campus. 3 The case
was remanded to the Second Circuit "for further consideration in light
of" Waters v. Churchill, 4 which involved public employee speech in a
non-academic setting. Presumably the Court meant to signal that its
second line of cases was to govern the Second Circuit's review. The
Court, however, gave no guidance as to whether it made any difference
if the CUNY faculty member's academic freedom had been infringed.
In order to understand how things have reached this point, this article
1. The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure drafted by
the American Association of University Professors and the Association of American
Colleges has been formally endorsed by some twelve dozen distinguished scholarly and
professional societies. See AMERICAN AsSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, POLIcY Doc-
UMENTS AND REPORTS 3-4, 7-10 (7th ed., 1990) (hereinafter Policy Documents and Reports).
See generally Symposium on Academic Freedom, 77 TFx. L. REV, 1247 (1988); Walter
P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 53
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (Summer 1990); and Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on Profes-
sional Academic Freedom: Second Thoughts on the Third "Essential Freedom," 45 STAN.
L. REv. 1835 (1993).
2. 115 S. Ct. 502, 503 (1994).
3. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.2d 1238 (2d Cir.), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994)
[hereinafter Jeffries I].
4. 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
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will review these two sets of cases, beginning with the Court's academic
freedom decisions. s
II. THE ACADEMIC FREEDOM CASES: FROM WIEMAN TO KEYISHIAN
Prompted by anxiety lest communists or other possible "subversives"
in academe corrupt American youth, various state officials during the
McCarthy era attempted to bar or purge suspected persons from faculties
of their respective states' public schools, colleges and universities.6
Initially, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment presented
no impediment to such attempts.7 The Court, however, soon came to
think otherwise.
A. Wieman v. Updegraff
In a case decided late in 1952, Wieman v. Updegraff," a virtually
unanimous Court9 found a state's loyalty oath to be unconstitutional.
The case arose out of an Oklahoma taxpayer's suit seeking to enjoin
state officials from paying salaries to some college faculty and staff
members who had refused to subscribe to a loyalty oath as required by
state law. The Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
oath.1 Earlier, the Supreme Court itself had upheld state loyalty oaths
in other settings, finding that they did not violate due process." But
now the Supreme Court found that the Oklahoma oath "offends due
process," stating that "Indiscriminate classification of innocent with
knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power.' '12 The
Wieman court did not refer directly either to academic freedom or to
5. See generally Richard H. Hiers, Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and
Universities: 0 Say Does that Star-Spangled First Amendment Banner Yet Wave?, 40
WAYNE L. REv. 1 (1993) (review of background issues for analysis of Jeffries and other
recent lower court decisions).
6. In an earlier era dominated by a different phobia, some states enacted laws
prohibiting schools from teaching foreign languages, notably, German. The Supreme
Court held that convictions under these laws unconstitutionally deprived teachers and
parents of their Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests without due process. See, e.g.,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 628-30 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S.
404, 412-13, 43 S. Ct. 628, 630 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
7. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 72 S. Ct. 380 (1952). Dissenting in
Adler, Justice Douglas referred specifically to "academic freedom," and stated: "The
Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone in our society.
All are entitled to it; and none needs it more than the teacher." Id. at 508-09, 72 S. Ct.
at 392-93.
8. 344 U.S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215 (1952).
9. Justice Clark wrote for the majority; Justices Burton and Douglas concurred in
the result without separate opinion; Justice Black wrbte a concurring opinion, as did
Justice Frankfurter (joined by Justice Douglas); Justice Jackson did not take part. Id. at
184, 192, 194, 73 S. Ct. at 215, 219, 220.
10. Id. at 184-85, 73 S. Ct. at 215.
11. Id. at 188-91, 73 S. Ct. at 217-19.
12. Id. at 191, 73 S. Ct. at 219.
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First Amendment rights of speech or association. However, it evidently
had such rights in mind:
[U]nder the Oklahoma Act, the fact of association alone determines
disloyalty and disqualification; it matters not whether association
existed innocently or knowingly. To thus inhibit individual free-
dom of movement is to stifle the flow of democratic expression
and controversy at one of its chief sources.1 3
"One of its chief sources" was the state's college and university system.
Justice Black's concurring opinion directly addressed the importance
of freedom of speech in and for a free society:
Our own free society should never forget that laws which stigmatize
and penalize thought and speech of the unorthodox have a way of
reaching, ensnaring ,and silencing many more people than at first
intended. We must have freedom of speech for all or we will in the
long run have it for none but the cringing and the craven. 14
In language of special interest, in view of later Supreme Court public
employee speech jurisprudence, Justice Black continued:
I cannot too often repeat my belief that the right to speak on
matters of public concern must be wholly free or eventually be
wholly lost. It seems self-evident that all speech criticizing gov-
ernment rulers and challenging current beliefs may be dangerous
to the status quo. With full knowledge of this danger the Framers
rested our First Amendment on the premise that the slightest
suppression of thought, speech, press, or public assembly is still
more dangerous. This means that individuals are guaranteed an
undiluted and unequivocal right to express themselves on ques-
tions of current public interest. It means that Americans discuss
such questions as of right and not on sufferance of legislatures,
courts or any other governmental agencies. It means that courts
are without power to appraise and penalize utterances upon their
notion that these utterances are dangerous. 15
As will be seen, the Court would, in later decades, hold that public
employees have a First Amendment right to speak only on "matters of
public concern"; that while state laws might not prohibit such speech,
governmental agency officials might punish lower-level employee
13. Id.
14. Id. at 193, 73 S. Ct. at 220 (Black, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 193-94, 73 S. Ct. at 220.
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speakers; and that courts could, upon the notion that such utterances
were not even dangerous, but merely-in the minds of such officials-
somehow contrary to agency efficiency, appraise and enforce punish-
ment of their speech. 16
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Wieman focused on the special
importance of academic free speech for a democratic society,1 7 an
emphasis notably absent in the Supreme Court's later line of public
employee speech cases:
That our democracy ultimately rests on public opinion is a platitude
of speech but not a commonplace in action .... The process of
education has naturally enough been the basis of hope for the
perdurance of our democracy on the part of all our great leaders,
from Thomas Jefferson onwards. To regard teachers-in our entire
educational system, from the primary grades to the university-as
the priests of our democracy is therefore not to indulge in hyper-
bole.... They cannot carry out their noble task if the conditions
for the practice of a responsible and critical mind are denied them.
They must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and
action, into the checkered history of social and economic dogma.'8
It remained for the Court to embody such understanding and language
in majority opinions.
B. Sweezy v. New Hampshire
The Supreme Court held academic freedom a particularly cherished
First Amendment value in a case decided five years after Wieman:
Sweezy v. New Hampshire.19 The core issue was whether the state
attorney general's investigation of Paul M. Sweezy's statements and
political beliefs and associations pursuant to state laws regulating
subversive activities deprived Sweezy of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment.20 Part of the investigation focused on the
contents of an invited lecture Sweezy had given at the University of
New Hampshire.21
In a plurality opinion by Chief Justice Warren, 22 the Court held that
the investigation "unquestionably" constituted "an invasion" of
16. See infra part Ill.
17. 344 U.S. at 194-98, 73 S. Ct. at 220-22 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 196, 73 S. Ct. at 221.
19. 354 U.S. 234, 77 S. Ct. 1203 (1957).
20. Id. at 235-37, 77 S. Ct. at 1204-05. Sweezy had been incarcerated for refusing to
answer several of the New Hampshire attorney general's questions. Id. at 244-45, 77 S.
Ct. at 1209.
21. Id. at 243-44, 77 S. Ct. at 1208.
22. The Chief Justice's opinion was joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan.
Id. at 235, 77 S. Ct. at 1204.
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Sweezy's "liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political
expression." 23 As to the importance of academic freedom, the plurality
wrote:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American uni-
versities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the
vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and
train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future
of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly compre-
hended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made....
Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire,
to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.24
Although the lecture under investigation had been given in a class on
campus, 25 the Court's language significantly does not limit the principle
or scope of academic freedom to classroom speech. The plurality found
that the attorney general's investigation violated Sweezy's Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests .26
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, concurred with the
plurality's holding.27 He did not refer explicitly to "academic freedom"
but did at several points agree with the plurality's position. For ex-
ample, Justice Frankfurter stated:
The problems that are the respective preoccupations of anthropol-
ogy, economics, law, psychology, sociology and related areas of
scholarship are merely departmentalized [ways of] dealing ...
with interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities. For society's
good-if understanding be an essential need of society-inquiries
into these problems, speculations about them, stimulation in others
of reflection upon them, must be left as unfettered as possible.
Political power must abstain from intrusion into this activity of
freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government and the
people's well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obvi-
ously compelling.28
23. Id. at 250, 77 S. Ct. at 1211.
24. Id., 77 S. Ct. at 1211-12.
25. Id. at 243, 77 S. Ct. at 1208.
26. Id. at 254-55, 77 S. Ct. at 1214.
27. Id. at 255-67, 77 S. Ct. at 1214-20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 261-62, 77 S. Ct. at 1217. Going on, Justice Frankfurter emphasized "the
dependence of a free society on free universities," adding, "This means the exclusion
of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university." Id. at 262, 77 S.
Ct. at 1217-18. He then proceeded to cite a South African document advocating various
freedoms necessary to advance the proper concerns of universities. Id. at 262, 77 S. Ct.
at 1219. See also id. at 266, 77 S. Ct. at 1218 ("In the political realm, as in the academic,
thought and action are presumptively immune from inquisition by political authority.").
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Thus, even though a majority of the Sweezy court could not agree on
common language, a majority shared the belief that academic freedom
was essential for the proper functioning and future of American society.
C. Keyishian v. Board of Regents
Ten years after Sweezy, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,29 a 5-4
majority of the Court at last agreed on common language enshrining
academic freedom within the shelter of the First Amendment. The case
concerned the Feinberg Act, a New York law, and attendant regulations
requiring state university faculty to sign a non-Communist affidavit or
else be dismissed.30 Plaintiffs were faculty members at SUNY, Buffalo,
who refused to subscribe to the mandated statements. Writing for the
majority, 31 Justice Brennan held that the Feinberg Act was unconstitu-
tionally vague and overbroad, and violated state teachers' First Amend-
ment rights to academic freedom and association. 32 Using both fresh
language and terms borrowed from earlier dissents, concurrences and
opinions, the Keyishian majority endorsed academic freedom as a
particularly important First Amendment principle.
Justice Brennan wrote, "Our Nation is deeply committed to safe-
guarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of
us and not merely to the teachers concerned. ' ' 3 3 It is important to note
that the Court here recognized academic freedom as an important matter
for teachers, but also, if not more so, as a "value" of "transcendent"
importance to or for the larger society. Justice Brennan added, "That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the class-
room."3 4 Quoting from Shelton v. Tucker,2 5 he continued, "The vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community of American schools."36 The majority underscored the role
of academic freedom in instilling the informed and critical leadership
skills necessary for the nation's future well-being:
The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Na-
tion's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a
29. 385 U.S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675 (1967).
30. Id. at 591-96, 87 S. Ct. at 677-80.
31. Id. at 591, 87 S. Ct. at 677 (Clark, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan, J., Stewart,
J. and White, J.).
32. Fifteen years earlier, the Court had upheld an earlier version of the Feinberg Act
in Adler. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The Keyishian majority distinguished
the issues before it from those confronting the Court in Adler. Id. at 593-95, 87 S. Ct.
at 678-79.
33. Id. at 603, 87 S. Ct. at 683.
34. Id.
35. 364 U.S. 479, 487, 81 S. Ct. 247, 251 (1960).
36. 385 U.S. at 603, 87 S. Ct. at 683.
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multitude of tongues' [rather] than through any kind of authori-
tative selection. 3 7
Reinforcing this point, the Court then quoted the Sweezy plurality's
ringing declaration, "The essentiality of freedom in the community of
American universities is almost self-evident. ' '38
Although Keyishian twice refers to "the classroom," there is no
reason to believe that the Court meant that First Amendment academic
freedom protected only classroom utterances. Various statements in
Sweezy which Keyishian quoted in full indicate that the Court under-
stood the First Amendment to protect academic freedom more compre-
hensively: "To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders
of our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Na-
tion. . . . Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding. ' '39
D. Other Academic Freedom Cases in the Supreme Court
Sweezy and Keyishian were the Court's landmark academic freedom
cases. Other decisions repeated language and themes from these cases
in majority opinions. At issue in Shelton v. Tucker,40 for example, was
Arkansas' public school teachers' First Amendment right of association.
Nevertheless, the Shelton Court emphasized the importance of freedom
of speech and inquiry, quoting extensively from Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Wieman and from the plurality opinion in
Sweezy. 41 Additionally, as noted above, Keyishian, in turn, quoted
relevant language from Shelton .42
In Baggett v. Bullitt,43 a number of University of Washington faculty,
staff and students asked the Court to review two state loyalty oath laws.
Finding the laws unconstitutionally vague, the Court commented that
its holding protected not only "the professors and other state employees
required to take the oath," but also, by virtue of its "judgment in favor
of teaching personnel," the University students' interests in academic
freedom. 44
In Whitehill v. Elkins,45 a Maryland loyalty oath case decided some
months after Keyishian, the Court invalidated the oath for vagueness
37. Id. (citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1, 65 S. Ct. 1416 (1945)).
38. 385 U.S. 589, 603, 87 S. Ct. 675, 684 (1967). See supra text accompanying note
24.
39. Id. at 603, 87 S. Ct. at 684 (emphasis added).
40. 364 U.S. 479, 81 S. Ct. 247 (1960).
41. Id. at 487, 81 S. Ct. at 251.
42. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. See also Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 104-05, 89 S. Ct. 266, 270 (1968) (quoting from both Shelton and Keyishian).
43. 377 U.S. 360, 84 S. Ct. 1316 (1964).
44. Id. at 366 n.5, 84 S. Ct. at 1320 n.5.
45. 389 U.S. 54, 88 S. Ct. 184 (1967).
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and for giving rise to surveillance it deemed "hostile to academic
freedom. ' ' 46 The Whitehill court again quoted the Sweezy plurality's
"essentiality of freedom . . . in American universities" language.4 7 The
Court referred explicitly to the deleterious effects of the Maryland oath
on teachers who, by attending "an international conference," might
somehow be ensnared by the law. Clearly the Whitehill court under-
stood academic freedom to bar off-campus "surveillance ' 4 and at least
implicitly, to protect speech in such contexts as participation in off-
campus conferences.
Academic freedom also figured as a factor in a few more recent
Supreme Court opinions, but none is directly relevant as background
for the issues presented in Jeffries v. Harleston.49
In each of the Supreme Court's major academic freedom cases, from
Weiman to Keyishian and Whitehill, the intrusions on faculty interests
came from state officials outside the respective schools, colleges, or
universities in question . 5 Typically, the intrusion was in the form of
some state-law loyalty oath or affidavit. These cases gave rise to the
Court's classic language extolling academic freedom as an "essential-
ity" or "transcendent value" important not only to faculty but also,
and especially, to the nation as a democratic society needing trained
and critical leaders.51 These cases did not say that academic freedom
is a transcendent value only as to external intrusions. Implicitly, aca-
demic freedom is an important value, whether threatened from outside
46. Id. at 60, 88 S. Ct. at 187.
47. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 24 & 38.
48. 389 U.S. at 59-60, 88 S. Ct. at 187.
49. See William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in
the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1990).
More recently, in University of Pa. v. E.E.O.C, 493 U.S. 182, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990),
the Court rejected the University's claim that it had "a First Amendment right of
'academic freedom' that would justify its refusal to provide the EEOC with tenure files
requested in connection with an employment discrimination investigation. Id. at 188,
197-201, 110 S. Ct. at 581, 586-88. On this case and emerging claims of institutional
academic freedom, see David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and
"Institutional" Academic Freedom under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 227 (Summer 1990); see also infra text accompanying notes 340-63 (review of
cases and emerging claims of institutional academic freedom).
50. But see Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 92 S. Ct. 2338 (1972) (state college's refusal
to recognize the chapter of Students for a Democratic Society, a campus organization).
In Healy, the Court stated, "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is
peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas,' and we break no new constitutional ground in
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom .... The mere
disagreement of the President with the group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it
recognition. As repugnant as these views may have been .... mere expression of them
would not justify the denial of First Amendment rights .... The College, acting here as
the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or association simply because it
finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent." Id. at 180-81, 187-88, 92 S.
Ct. at 2345, 2349.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 33, 38 & 47.
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political interference, or from inside arbitrary or intentional retaliation
on the part of administrators or faculty colleagues. For over half a
century, many of the nation's leading academic and professional higher
education associations have subscribed to the standards for academic
freedom set out in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure.5 2 The 1940 Statement nowhere states or implies
that academic freedom is to be protected only from extramural con-
straint. 53 Nor has the Supreme Court ever said that First Amendment
academic freedom was so limited. The Court itself has referred specif-
ically to potential intramural infringement in a case involving students'
academic freedom.54 Lower federal courts, additionally, have upheld
faculty members' academic freedom against violation by campus ad-
ministrators .5 5
Nevertheless, in a series of decisions in which the Court was strangely
silent as to academic freedom, the Court at first recognized, but then
severely restricted, the First Amendment free speech rights of high
school teachers and other public employees generally. The Court has
never receded from its classic academic freedom decisions which,
therefore, presumably remain good law. But how the Court's elevation
of academic freedom to the status of an "essentiality" or transcendent
value "for all of us" is to be understood in view of the Court's apparent
hostility to public employee free speech in its more recent line of cases
remains to be seen.
52. See supra note 1.
53. The 1940 Statement reads, in relevant part:
(a) Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of
the results, subject to the adequate performance of their other academic duties
(b) Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject
(c) College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession,
and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens,
they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline ....
POLIcY DOcUMENTS AND REPORTS, supra note 1, at 3-4.
54. See Healy, supra note 50.
55. See, e.g., Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.3d 587, 596-98 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing
classic language from Shelton, Sweezy, and Keyishian, where a black faculty member
had been denied tenure in retaliation for statements in course syllabus and in class
describing Zionism as a form of racism); Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 829 (6th Cir.
1989) (professor's First Amendment right to academic freedom violated by university
officials who ordered him to change a student's grade); Trotman v. Board of Trustees,
635 F.2d 216, 230 (3d Cir. 1980) (where professor alleged that president had suppressed
criticisms of university policy, "the standard applied . . . should be the one applicable
to the rights of teachers and students 'in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment,' " (citing Tinker v. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S. Ct. 733, 736
(1969); and Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675, 681 (4th Cir. 1978) (dismissal of
tenured professors purportedly for financial exigency "must be demonstrably bona fide,"
else college administrators could "subvert academic freedom")).
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III. THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH CASES:
FROM Pickering To Waters
Until 1968, former Massachusetts Supreme Court Justice Holmes'
1892 pronouncement about a policeman's rights still seemed an apt
characterization of government employees' First Amendment speech
rights generally: "[H]e may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. '5 6 In 1968, the
Supreme Court held that government employee speech is protected
under the First Amendment. A series of subsequent Supreme Court
decisions somewhat clarified, slightly broadened, but on the whole
narrowly delimited lower-ranking government employees' speech rights.
Each later decision contributed at least one further extension or quali-
fication of such rights. The task of describing and analyzing these cases
is complicated by the Court's often peculiarly opaque language and
reasoning .7
A. Pickering v. Board of Education
Marvin Pickering, a high school teacher, wrote a letter published in
the local newspaper criticizing school officials' handling of recent
school revenue bond proposals., The Board considered Pickering's
letter "detrimental to the efficient operation and administration" of the
district schools, and dismissed him.5 9 The Supreme Court held that this
dismissal violated Pickering's First Amendment "rights to freedom of
56. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892). The Supreme
Court itself echoed Holmes in Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492, 72 S. Ct.
380, 384-85 (1952): "[Teachers] have no right to work for the State in the school system
on their own terms .... If they do not choose to work on [the system's] terms, they are
at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere."
57. For a consideration of the 5th and 11th Circuits' interpretation and application
of the Supreme Court's public employee free speech decisions thru 1987, see Richard H.
Hiers, First Amendment Speech Rights of Government Employees: Trends and Problems
in Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit Decisions, 45 SMU L. REV. 741, 744-71 (1991)
[hereinafter First Amendment Speech Rights]; and Hiers, Public Employees' Free Speech:
An Endangered Species of First Amendment Rights in Supreme Court and Eleventh
Circuit Jurisprudence, 5 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 169, 177-97, 233-56 (1993) [hereinafter
Public Employees' Free Speech]. See also Hiers, supra note 5. In these articles, as here,
we consider only cases where public employees were sanctioned after speaking on the
basis of their superiors' ad hoc disapproval.
The Court has also developed a line of cases dealing with attempts to limit speech in
advance by law or regulation. See, e.g., United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003 (1995) (portion of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 prohibiting
Executive Branch employees below grade GS-16 from accepting compensation for certain
types of appearances, speeches, or articles held to violate First Amendment). These cases
have applied basic criteria set out in Pickering v. Board of Education, discussed infra
part III.A. See, e.g., Treasury Employees, 115 S. Ct. at 1012; Civil Service Comm'n v.
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564, 93 S. Ct. 2880, 2890 (1973).
58. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1732-33 (1969).
59. Id. at 565, 88 S. Ct. at 1733.
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speech."60 Justice Marshall wrote for the Court. The Court gave little
guidance as to how similar future claims should be analyzed, but in
dicta, set out some considerations that might apply.
Citing Wieman, Shelton, and Keyishian-but without mentioning
academic freedom-the Court stated that teachers may no longer "be
compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would oth-
erwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in
connection with the operation of the public schools in which they
work.' '61 The Court did not say whether teachers would enjoy consti-
tutional protection only to the extent that they commented on "matters
of public interest,16 2 or, if so, why that qualification was required.63
Nor did Justice Marshall explain whether he really meant to say that
teachers' right to speak would be limited to matters "in connection
with the operation of the public schools in which they work." Other
"citizens" could speak about matters of public interest without regard
to employment settings. Justice Marshall likely meant to say that teach-
ers enjoy the right as citizens to speak about all matters of public
interest, including those relating to the public schools where they work.
However, Justice Marshall observed, "[T]he State has interests as an
employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ signifi-
cantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the
speech of the citizenry in general. "64 He identified only one such state
interest, namely: "promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees. ' 65 The Court cited no authority for
identifying "efficiency" as a state interest,6 6 nor did it say whether
such interest had to be compelling. The Court then set out what later
would be known as the Pickering "balancing formula":
60. Id. at 564-65, 88 S. Ct. at 1733.
61. Id. at 568, 88 S. Ct. at 1734.
62. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech,
Press and Association, 97 HARV. L. REv. 70, 167 (1983) [hereinafter The Supreme Court,
1982 Term].
63. It is possible that Justice Marshall drew this language from Justice Black's
concurrence in Wieman. See supra text accompanying note 15. It is not clear that Justice
Black had meant to say that only speech "on matters of public concern" was to be free;
moreover, Justice Black was referring to all Americans' right to speak. See supra text
accompanying note 17.
64. 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S. Ct. at 1734-35.
65. Id. By "efficiency" the Court may have intended to include "effectiveness." Later
the Court simply added "effectiveness" to the Pickering formula. See infra note 145 and
Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1888 (1994).
66. The Pickering Court did not explain the constitutional basis for such "interests,"
e.g., whether they derived from state police powers. The Court undertook further expla-
nation of these interests twenty-six years later, in Waters, 114 . Ct. at 1886-88; but the
Waters Court did not attempt to derive this interest from the Constitution either. Instead,
it simply stated, "the extra power of the government ... in this area comes from the
nature of the government's mission." Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887. Perhaps the Court had
in mind some kind of "natural law" theory. Or perhaps the Court simply accepted at
face value the Board's contention that it had an interest in the schools' "efficient operation
and administration." 391 U.S. at 564, 88 S. Ct. at 1732-33.
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The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.67
The Court gave no clue as to what kinds of interests a teacher might
have as a citizen in making such comments; nor did it indicate here
what kinds of matters might be "of public concern ' ' 68 or who would
decide that question; and it did not explain why a state's efficiency
interest should be regarded as a constitutional counterweight to a
teacher's First Amendment rights. The Court also did not say whether
strict scrutiny was to apply when courts balanced these "interests."
Because the Court found that Pickering's comments had no effect on
the school district's efficiency,69 the Court did not have to engage in
"balancing" or show how the respective interests should be weighted.
Was a teacher's own interest in speaking considered a First Amendment
right, or merely a nominal, perhaps only feather-weight, "interest"?
The Pickering court emphasized the importance of public employees'
free speech to the public,70 but did not identify the importance of that
right to the speaker-employee himself. Perhaps the Court considered
such importance too obvious to mention. Justice Marshall indicated
some considerations that might, in other cases, implicate agency effi-
ciency, including possible interference with "maintaining ... disci-
pline by immediate superiors" or "harmony among coworkers. ' ' 71 The
Court also suggested the importance of "close working relationships"
where "personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to their proper
functioning.' 72 The Court speculated that in some situations, a breach
of confidentiality "might furnish a permissible ground for dismissal." 73
Finally, the Court suggested that there might be situations in public
employment where "the relationship between superior and subordinate
is of such a personal and intimate nature that certain forms of public
criticism of the superior by the subordinate would seriously undermine
the effectiveness of the working relationship between them."74 Appar-
67. 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S. Ct. at 1734-35.
68. But see id. at 571-72, 88 S. Ct. at 1736, discussed infra text accompanying notes
80-82, where the Court indicates that funding public schools is a matter of public
concern.
69. Id. at 571-73, 88 S. Ct. at 1736-37.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 570, 88 S. Ct. at 1735. The Court probably did not consider such matters
as "discipline" and "harmony" as state interests as such, but rather viewed them as
important only to the extent that they affected agency efficiency. Compare infra text
accompanying notes 144-45.
72. 391 U.S. at 570, 88 S. Ct. at 1735.
73. Id. at 570 n.3., 88 S. Ct. at 1735 n.3.
74. Id.
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ently the Court presumed that undermining "relationships" necessarily
would impact adversely on a state agency's efficiency in performing
services to the public.
The Pickering court emphasized that in order to weigh against an
employee's speech rights, the working relationship would have to be
affected directly. Pickering did not have a direct working relationship
with the School Board. Moreover, the Court would not accept the
Board's implicit equation of its own members' interests with those of
the school's. 7 5 It therefore made no difference if his comments were
"critical in tone" or "angered" the Board. 76
Later in its opinion, the Court mentioned one additional type of
possible adverse efficiency impact: whether a teacher's speech "im-
peded [his] proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom." 77
The Court did not explain how this might happen, as impeding class-
room duties was not an issue before the Court.
In a footnote, the Court described a possible scenario in which a
teacher permissibly could be sanctioned for making public statements:
We also note that this case does not present a situation in which
a teacher's public statements are so without foundation as to call
into question his fitness to perform his duties in the classroom.
In such a case, of course, the statements would merely be evidence
of the teacher's general competence, or lack thereof, and not an
independent basis for dismissal. 78
In that kind of situation, superiors engaged in sanctioning would need
to distinguish carefully between disapproving the content of the speech,
and assessing the speech as indicative of the teacher's competence (or
otherwise) . 79
Sandwiched into its discussion of the protected status of erroneous
or false speech, the Court stated that Pickering's letter dealt with "the
question whether a school system requires additional funds. '"o This,
the Court said, was "a matter of legitimate public concern" 81:
75. Id. at 571, 88 S Ct. at 1736.
76. "[T]o the extent that the Board's position here can be taken to suggest that even
comments on matters of public concern that are substantially correct ... may furnish
grounds for dismissal if they are sufficiently critical in tone, we unequivocally reject it."
Id. at 570, 88 S. Ct. at 1735. "In addition, the fact that particular illustrations [that
Pickering offered as to the Board's] emphasis on athletic programs are false would not
normally have any necessary impact on the actual operation of the schools, beyond [their]
tendency to anger the Board." Id. at 571, 88 S. Ct. at 1736.
77. Id. at 572-73, 88 S. Ct. at 1737.
78. Id. at 573 n.5, 88 S. Ct. at 1737 n.5..
79. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
80. 391 U.S. at 571, 88 S. Ct. at 1736.
81. Id. Here the Court probably meant that school funding was undoubtedly of public
concern, not that there might be matters of illegitimate public concern. Or is "legitimate"
here equivalent to "important?" See infra text accompanying note 85.
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On such a question free and open debate is vital to informed
decision-making by the electorate. Teachers are, as a class, the
members of a community most likely to have informed and definite
opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools
should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to
speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory
dismissal.82
The Court here may have meant that because such a matter was
important to the public, the public's interest should be weighed, along
with the teacher's own interest in speaking, when "balancing" First
Amendment values against possible adverse effects on agency effi-
ciency. It seems unlikely that the Court intended the importance of
such speech to the public to be left out of the "balancing" equation. 83
Moreover, it is difficult to imagine that a teacher (or other public
employee) would be "able to speak out freely . . . without fear of
retaliatory dismissal" if public interest in her speech was not included
on the scales. Otherwise, any even slightly negative effect on agency
"efficiency" easily might outweigh the speaker's own mere "interest"
in speaking.84 Unfortunately, the Court did not incorporate the public's
interest into the Pickering equation. Perhaps the Court simply assumed
that the public's interest would be considered by courts subsequently
engaging in Pickering balancing.
Curiously, Pickering's purported holding makes no mention of either
efficiency or balancing. Instead, without further qualification, the Court
concluded:
In sum, we hold that, in a case such as this, absent proof of false
statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher's
exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may
not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.85
The Court seemed to say here that when a teacher speaks on a matter
of public importance, such speech is protected by the First Amendment,
82. 391 U.S. at 571-72, 88 S. Ct. at 1737.
83. See id. at 573, 88 S. Ct. at 1737 (Court refers to the "great . . . public interest in
having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance-the core value of
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.")
84. Although the Pickering Court often refers to teachers' free speech rights, its
balancing formula refers only to speech interests. See supra text accompanying note 67.
The Court did not explain why the formula tacitly reduced speakers' First Amendment
rights to "interests." Perhaps Justice Marshall thought such language necessary in order
to secure a majority of votes on the Court. This weakened language put public employee-
speakers' rights on the same level as largely undefined government "interests."
85. 391 U.S. at 574, 88 S. Ct. at 1738. See also id.: "This Court has also indicated,
in more general terms, that statements by public officials on matters of public concern
must be accorded First Amendment protection despite the fact that the statements are
directed at their nominal superiors."
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regardless of whether the speech affects "the efficiency of the public
services" performed. Perhaps the Court meant to say that dismissal
would be permissible only if the teacher's speech right was outweighed
by governmental efficiency interests.
One matter was clear in Pickering: Pickering had been dismissed
because of the "speech" contained in his published letter. But what
should courts do it it is uncertain whether a teacher was dimissed (or
otherwise punished) because of her speech, or for some other reason?
The Court addressed that question in its next decision in the Pickering
line of cases.
B. Mount Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle
Fred Doyle, an untenured high school teacher and president of the
local teacher's association, "was involved in several incidents" includ-
ing disputes with another teacher and cafeteria workers and his having
made a crude remark and an "obscene gesture" to certain students.86
Doyle also relayed to a local radio station the substance of a memoran-
dum from the principal regarding "teacher dress and appearance. ' '8 7
The principal construed the broadcast report on the dress code as a
criticism, and recommended that Doyle's employment be terminated.
The statement of reasons expressed doubt as to his "sincerity in estab-
lishing good school relationships" and mentioned the obscene gesture
and the radio incidents. 8 The district court held that Doyle's call to
the radio station was protected speech and had "played a 'substantial
part' " in the Board's non-renewal decision, and that Doyle was entitled
to reinstatement.89
The Supreme Court's unanimous 1977 opinion was written by Justice
Rehnquist. Without determining whether Doyle's speech related to a
matter of public concern, the Court agreed that it was protected under
the First Amendment. 90 The Court, however, was troubled by the district
court's finding that the Board could have based the non-renewal on
constitutionally permissible grounds. The Court therefore vacated the
lower court's decision, and remanded in order to give the Board
opportunity to show "by the preponderance of the evidence that it
would have reached the same decision as to [Doyle's] re-employment
even in the absence of the protected conduct."' 91 Justice Rehnquist
86. Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 281-82, 97 S. Ct. 568, 573
(1977).
87. Id. at 282, 97 S. Ct. at 573.
88. Id. at 282-83, 97 S. Ct. at 574.
89. Id. at 283, 97 S. Ct. at 574.
90. Id. at 283-84, 97 S. Ct. at 574-75.
91. Id. at 287, 97 S. Ct. at 576. The Mt. Healthy Court regularly refers to speech as
"conduct." The First Amendment, of course, does not generally protect "conduct." Here
again the Court's language tipped the Pickering balance against public employee speech.
On remand, the district court found that the Board would have reached the same decision
for constitutionally permissible reasons. Doyle v. Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ., 670 F.2d 59,
61 (6th Cir. 1982).
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evidently believed that if Doyle were reinstated, he would receive
tenure, and mistakenly supposed that a tenured teacher could not be
dismissed for cause.9 2 Moreover, he was concerned lest, under the
district court's "substantial part" rule, a clever but "marginal candi-
date" could, by engaging in "constitutionally protected conduct ...
prevent his employer from assessing his performance record and reach-
ing a decision not to rehire on the basis of that review." 93 Justice
Rehnquist appears to have ignored the critical point that such a result
would be obtained only if the teacher's administrative superiors were
unable to bring themselves to deny continuing employment solely on
the basis of unprotected conduct, or were so unwise as to penalize him
for his constitutionally protected speech.94
Mt. Healthy thus added two steps to Pickering analysis: these steps
related to causation, and (as later became clear), were questions for the
trier of fact. Under the original Pickering analysis, a plaintiff had the
burden of showing that his speech was "constitutionally protected."95
Now a plaintiff also must prove that this speech was at least a "sub-
stantial" or "motivating" factor underlying the superior's adverse per-
sonnel action.96 Second, the defendant superior would be given a chance
to show "that it would have reached the same decision" on constitu-
tionally permissible grounds, even though the defendant had based its
actual decision at least in substantial part on the plaintiff's protected
speech.
97
The first causation requirement already was implied in Pickering-
where there was no doubt as to why the Board had sought the teacher's
dismissal. But the second-or second chance-causation step was both
unnecessary and dangerous to teacher's speech rights. It was unnec-
essary because public agency superiors can act solely on constitutionally
permissible grounds when considering teachers' or other public em-
ployees' speech. 98 The Pickering court already had anticipated one such
situation. 99 It was dangerous because it meant that agency superiors
92. 429 U.S. at 286, 97 S. Ct. at 575-76. See Ralph S. Brown & Jordan E. Kurland,
Academic Tenure and Academic Freedom, 53 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325 (Summer
1990).
93. 429 U.S. at 286, 97 S. Ct. at 575 (emphasis added).
94. See Note, The Nonpartisan Freedom of Expression of Public Employees, 76 MICH.
L. REV. 365, 378 (1977).
95. 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S. Ct. at 576. The Court meant by this that the speech either
related to public concern or that it survived Pickering balancing. See id. at 284, 97 S.
Ct. at 574-75.
96. Id. at 287, 97 S. Ct. at 576. Judicial economy would better be served where this
question is in doubt if it is treated first, since failure to so prove would be dispositive.
Courts could also avoid generating needless dicta as to other Pickering elements by
deciding only dispositive questions.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. See, e.g., Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005 (2d Cir. 1994); Megill v. Board of
Regents, 541 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Campbell City Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d
1242 (10th Cir. 1975); Moore v. Winfield City Bd. of Educ., 452 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1971).
99. See supra text accompanying note 78.
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need not act only on permissible grounds, but now might punish
teachers for constitutionally protected speech, and then afterwards claim
that they really would have taken the same punitive action solely for
other reasons if only they had thought to do so at the time. The door
was now open for manufacturing pretexts'00 and fact triers now would
have to engage in second-guessing.1°1
An obvious matter remained unsettled. Both Pickering and Doyle had
spoken to or through the media. What if a teacher attempted to resolve
a problem "through channels" by speaking privately with her superior?
Two years later, the Court addressed this issue.
C. Givhan v. Consolidated School District
Bessie Givhan was dismissed from her position as a junior high
school teacher, primarily, the district court found, because on two
occasions in private meetings with the school principal, she had made
certain "demands" or "complaints. '"1 0 2 During these meetings, she
expressed concerns about the school's employment policies and prac-
tices which she "conceived to be racially discriminatory in purpose or
effect.103 The district court held the dismissal violated her First
Amendment rights. The Fifth Circuit reversed on the theory that, under
Pickering and other Supreme Court decisions, the First Amendment
did not extend to public employees' privately expressed criticisms. 0 4
The Supreme Court clarified the matter: "While those cases each
arose in the context of a public employee's public expression, the rule
to be derived from them is not dependent on that largely coincidental
fact." 1°5 Givhan's main contribution is the point that the First Amend-
ment protects "the public employee who arranges to communicate
privately with his employer10 6 rather than to spread his views before
the public."107
The Givhan court added, however, that public and private speech
were to be analyzed differently in appraising effects on institutional
efficiency: "When a teacher speaks publicly, it is generally the content
100. See Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public
Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 3, 18-20 (1987).
101. See Note, Free Speech and Impermissible Motive in the Dismissal of Public
Employees, 89 YALE L.J. 376, 387-91 (1979).
102. Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 411-13, 99 S. Ct.
693, 694-95 (1979).
103. Id. at 413, 99 S. Ct. at 695.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 414, 99 S. Ct. at 696.
106. Here, as frequently occurs in this line of cases, the Court uses the terms "em-
ployer" or "government employer" (or even "the government") to refer to higher-ranking
public employees authorized to make personnel decisions affecting lower-ranking public
employees. Such "employers" are themselves public employees, not divinely (or other-
wise) ordained lords of private fiefdoms.
107. 439 U.S. at 415-16, 99 S. Ct. at 696-97.
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of his statements that must be assessed" to determine adverse impact. 10
In some situations involving private expression, however, "additional
factors" are to be considered:
When a government employee personally confronts his immediate
superior, the employing agency's institutional efficiency may be
threatened not only by the content of the employee's message but
also by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered. 1°9
The Court cited no authority for invoking these new "additional fac-
tors." 110 Nor did it explain why these factors should be relevant to the
appraisal of private expression. For the time being, it seemed that
private expression by teachers (and by other public employees) would
enjoy virtually the same protection as public speech.
The Court never mentioned whether Givhan's criticisms related to
matters of public concern."' That question, and a number of new
considerations, came to prominence in the Court's next major public
employee free speech decision, which was announced in 1983.
D. Connick v. Myers
Sheila Myers, an assistant district attorney in New Orleans, prose-
cuted offenders in one section of the parish court, and counseled youth
offenders in another.112 She objected to her supervisors' plan to transfer
her as prosecutor to the latter section because, in her view, prosecuting
offenders she had previously counseled posed potential conflicts of
interest. She discussed this and other concerns with the supervisors." 13
Responding to a supervisor's comment that no one else in the office
shared her concerns, Myers prepared a questionnaire and circulated it
among fellow assistant district attorneys to ascertain their views." 4 The
supervisor then advised District Attorney Harry Connick that Myers
108. id. at 415 n.4, 99 S. Ct. at 696 n.4.
109. Id.
110. "Time, place and manner" had figured in the Court's earlier evaluation of attempts
to regulate speech in the community at large. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192-93,
193 n.23, 92 S. Ct. 2338, 2352, 2352 n.23 (1972).
111. Although the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit on the private expression
issue, it remanded, in light of Mt. Healthy, so that the district court could determine
whether Givhan would have been rehired "but for" her criticism, in other words, to
give the School District opportunity to show that it would have dismissed her anyway
on constitutionally permissible grounds. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 417, 99 S. Ct. at 697. On
remand, the district court concluded that Givhan had been dismissed solely in retaliation
for her protected speech, and that the other reasons "belatedly" advanced by the.School
District were "after-thoughts or pretextual." The Fifth Circuit affirmed. See Ayers v.
Consolidated Sch. Dist., 691 F.2d 766, 769-70 (5th Cir. 1982).
112. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 753 (E.D.La.), aff'd 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.
1981) (unpublished opinion), rev'd, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
113. Id. at 753-54.
114. id. at 754-55.
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"was causing a 'mini-insurrection.' " Connick fired Myers for refusing
to accept the transfer. 115
The district court found Connick's reason pretextual, and determined
that Connick had fired Myers for circulating the questionnaire. 116 The
district court noted Pickering's emphasis on "the 'public interest in
having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance' ""7
and its insistence "that 'statements by public officials on matters of
public concern must be afforded First Amendment protection' even
though the statements may be directed at [their] 'nominal super-
iors.' "'"s Viewing Myers' questionnaire "as a whole," the district court
held that the questionnaire raised issues "relate[d] to the effective
functioning of the District Attorney's Office" that were "matters of
public importance and concern.""' 9 Noting that Givhan extended con-
stitutional protection to private expression, the court held that Myers'
questionnaire was protected under the First Amendment. 120 Under Fifth
Circuit case law, a Pickering plaintiff's speech was entitled to First
Amendment protection "unless it substantially and materially or un-
duly" interfered with effective agency operations. 12 1 The district court
found that Myers' "speech" had not adversely affected Connick's "in-
terest in promoting the efficiency of the public services performed
through his employees," and awarded both reinstatement and back
pay. 122 The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 123
The Supreme Court reversed by a 5-4 vote in Connick v. Myers. 124
Justice White wrote for the majority. 1 25 Connick's reasoning, result, and
contorted language have been criticized. 12 6 In effect, the Connick court
115. Id. at 755.
116. Id. at 755-56.
117. Id. at 756.
118. Id. at 757 (citing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574, 88 S. Ct. 1731,
1737 (1968)).
119. Id. at 758.
120. Id. at 757.
121. Id. The court cited a variety of related standards applied in prior Fifth Circuit
case law. See id. at 757 n.4, 758; Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1980)
("unduly interfered"); Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915, 919 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980)
(citing 7th and ioth Circuit decisions applying "material and substantial" interference
or disruption standards); Kaprelian v. Texas Woman's University, 509 F.2d 133 (5th Cir.
1975) ("'clearly over-balanced' the employee's 'usefulness' as an employee"); Smith v.
United States, 502 F.2d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 1974) ("substantially and materially inter-
feres").
122. 507 F. Supp. at 759-60.
123. Myers v. Connick, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct.
1684 (1983).
124. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983).
125. Id. at 140, 103 S. Ct. at 1686. Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Id. at 156, 103 S. Ct. at 1695.
126. See generally Supreme Court 1982 Term, supra note 62, at 164-72; Stephen
Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public
Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 50-65 (1988) (discussing Connick's applications in lower federal
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put a series of new pitfalls and obstacles in the way of public employees
who wished to vindicate their speech rights.
In oddly cryptic language, the Court intimated that in order to be
protected by the First Amendment, a public employee's speech must
relate to a matter of public concern. The opinion left unclear whether
speech would be protected if it dealt with both personal and public
concerns. 127 A "public concern" requirement may have been implicit
in some of its earlier decisions, 12 8 but the Court had yet to characterize
this as the "threshold question" or "test."
The Connick court announced two new criteria that were to be applied
in determining whether employee speech addressed matters of public
concern: in addition to "the content," now the "form, and context of
a given statement, as revealed by the whole record would be consid-
ered. '"129 The Court cited no authority and provided no explanation for
adding these new criteria. The Court also declared that the "inquiry
into the protected status of speech is one of law, not fact. "13 The Court
meant that in determining whether a particular "speech" related to a
matter of public concern, a reviewing court was not bound by trial
court findings, but could apply its own judgment de novo.
Reviewing the record de novo, the Court concluded that all but one
item on Myers' questionnaire were "mere extensions" of her "dispute
over her transfer to another section of the criminal court.' '131 The
implication of this and other expressions in Connick was that employ-
ees' concerns as to "internal office affairs"-including assignments
involving conflict of interest and the office's effective functioning-
would be viewed as mere grievances or personal matters, rather than
as matters of public concern.1 32 The Connick court presumed that the
courts) [hereinafter From Connick to Confusion]; Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters
of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1 (1990); and Hiers, supra note 5, at 34-41.
127. "We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters
of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest,
absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in
which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly
in reaction to the employee's behavior." 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S. Ct. at 1690 (emphasis
added). A page earlier, the Court had said: "Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny
lead us to conclude that if Myers' questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as
constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize
the reasons for her discharge." Id. at 146, 103 S. Ct. at 1690.
128. See id. at 144-46, 103 S. Ct. at 1688-89.
129. Id. at 147-48, 103 S. Ct. at 1690.
130. Id. at 148 n.7, 103 S. Ct. at 1690 n.7.
131. Id. at 148, 103 S. Ct. at 1690. The Court ignored the fact that the "dispute"
started because Myers was concerned to avoid conflicts of interest, hardly a matter only
of personal concern. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13.
132. "[TJhe First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable
for employee complaints over internal office affairs." 461 U.S. at 149, 103 S. Ct. at 1691.
"Myers' questionnaire ... is most accurately characterized as an employee grievance
concerning internal office policy." Id. at 154, 103 S. Ct. at 1693-94.
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public has-or should have-no interest in intra-office speech relating
to agency operations, effectiveness, or possible conflicts of interest.
This conclusion ignored and effectively narrowed Pickering's insistence
that public employees have a First Amendment right "to comment on
matters of public concern in connection with the operation of the public
[agencies] in which they work.' ' 13 3 The effect of this personal/public
concern dichotomy seemed to be that even speech on a matter of public
concern would not be protected if the speaker-employee herself was in
any way affected by the situation about which she spoke; whether the
Court specifically intended this is unclear. 134
The Court also suggested that if a public employee chose not to draw
her concerns to public attention, it would weigh against her claim to
have spoken on matters of public concern.1 35 To protect her speech, it
would seem, an employee must at least attempt to make it public. This
suggestion, if it became a requirement, tacitly would overrule Givhan.136
The Connick majority erroneously asserted that Pickering had said
that in "balancing" a public employee's speech, "the State's burden
in justifying a particular discharge varies depending upon the nature
[or importance] of the employee's expression.' 3 7 The Connick court
meant that reviewing courts were free to prioritize matters of public
concern and to lessen the burdens on defendants when the courts
deemed the matters of lesser importance. 138 The Court did not say what
criteria would determine whether an expression or topic was more or
133. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1734 (1968). See
Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Comment, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment
on the Public Concern Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1118-20 (1988). See also supra
text accompanying note 61. Issues of the sort raised in Myers' questionnaire arguably
are of public concern.
134. See supra note 127.
135. "Myers did not seek to inform the public that the District Attorney's Office was
not discharging its governmental responsibilities .... " 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S. Ct. at
1690-91. "Here . . . a questionnaire not otherwise of public concern does not attain that
status because its subject matter could, in different circumstances, have been the topic
of a communication to the public that might have been of general interest." Id. at 148
n.8, 103 S. Ct. at 1691 n.8.
136. The Connick Court tried to distinguish its analysis from that in Givhan. That
case involved an employee speaking out "as a citizen on a matter . .. not tied to a
personal employment dispute," but rather on "a matter inherently of public concern,"
namely, racial discrimination. Id. at 148 n.8, 103 S. Ct. at 1691 n.8. This distinction
does not explain why the Court considered it relevant, in view of Givhan, that Myers
had not attempted to go public. It should be obvious that agency working relationships
and effectiveness normally are better served by encouraging employees to work out
differences of opinion internally, rather than by rushing to the media.
137. 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S. Ct. at 1692-93. The Connick Court cited no language or
pages in Pickering to support this assertion. Although Pickering did refer to the impor-
tance of an issue addressed by an employee's speech, it said nothing about weighing or
balancing its importance. See supra text accompanying note 85.
138. See also 461 U.S. at 152, 103 S. Ct. at 1692-93 ("[A] stronger showing may be
necessary if the employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public con-
cern.").
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less important. Presumably courts would know intuitively or via "ju-
dicial notice" which matters were of greater importance. Even though
the Connick court conceded that one item in Myers' questionnaire
"touched upon a matter of public concern,' 1 39 it concluded that, taken
as a whole, the questionnaire "touched upon matters of public concern
in only a most limited sense.' 140
The Court tacitly overruled the Fifth Circuit standard that had re-
quired defendants in such cases to prove that the employee-plaintiff's
speech had interfered "materially and substantially" with the agency's
performance of services to the public. Such a burden, it said, was
"unduly onerous.' '141 It was unclear whether the "materially and sub-
tantially interfered" burden would still apply if the reviewing court
considered the speech important.
Without finding the district court's conclusion clearly erroneous,
Justice White stated that courts should give "a wide degree of defer-
ence" to an agency superior's judgment as to speech the superior
deemed to interfere with "close working relationships . . .essential to
fulfilling public responsibilities."'' 42 Moreover, Justice White wrote,
courts should defer to an agency superior's reasonable belief that
employee speech would at some future time adversely affect agency
operations. 43 The Court did not bother to remand to the district court
to see whether Connick could prove that he reasonably had believed
that Myers' questionnaire would, somehow, adversely affect the effi-
ciency (or effectiveness) of his office's performance of its public serv-
ices. The Court simply "reversed" based on its own reading of the
139. Id. at 149, 103 S. Ct. at 1691. That item was the question: "Do you ever feel
pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates?" Id.
at 155, 103 S. Ct. at 1694. The expression "touched upon" was obviously dismissive.
The Court never did actually assess or "weigh" the importance of this question in its
Pickering balancing.
140. Id. at 154, 103 S. Ct. at 1693-94.
141. Id. at 149-50, 103 S. Ct. at 1691. See supra note 121. As to Connick's effect on
this standard in Fifth and Eleventh Circuit case law, see First Amendment Free Speech,
supra note 57, at 820-24, and Public Employees' Free Speech, supra note 57, at 279-82.
142. 461 U.S. at 151-52, 103 S. Ct. at 1692. Even though Myers had not personally
confronted her supervisors with her questionnaire or its findings, the Connick Court
applied Givhan's "manner, time, and place" criteria. Id. at 152-53, 103 S. Ct. at 1693.
In addition, the Court added, without citation to authority or explanation, a new
"context" test. Id. at 153, 103 S. Ct. at 1693. The Court found it a "fact" that the
"questionnaire emerged after a persistent dispute .. .over office transfer policy," and
concluded that it was therefore best viewed as a mere "employee grievance concerning
internal office policy." Id. at 154, 103 S. Ct. at 1693-94. See supra note 131.
143. "[W]e do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the
extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is
manifest before taking action." 461 U.S. at 152, 103 S. Ct. at 1692. The Connick Court
regularly referred to agency superiors as "employers." See also id. at 154, 103 S. Ct. at
1692-94: "The limited First Amendment interest involved here does not require that
Connick tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine
his authority, and destroy close working relationships."
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record.14 In doing so, the Court showed a willingness to presume that
once an agency superior characterized speech as "disruptive" or as
threatening to "discipline," "office routine," "working relationships,"
or the superior's "authority," it was reasonable for him to believe that
it would adversely affect the agency's efficient performance of public
services. Or perhaps the Connick Court thought speech so characterized
constituted sufficient grounds for dismissal, whether it was likely to
affect the agency's performance of services or not. 145 After Connick, it
was unclear whether agency superiors would have to prove that they
reasonably entertained such fears, or whether it would be enough for
them to recite at trial that they had entertained some such concerns. 146
Whether such contentions were persuasive would now be a matter of
law for the reviewing court to decide by its own "independent consti-
tutional judgment,' 4 7 i.e., de novo. Did this mean that appellate courts
and the Supreme Court were now licensed to become super-fact-finders
when it came to deciding all facts related to Pickering balancing? 14 1
After Connick, it seemed unlikely that a public employee could
prevail on a First Amendment speech claim;49 it was not impossible,
however, at least in 1987.
E. Rankin v. McPherson
The Supreme Court modified its public employee speech jurispru-
dence in Rankin v. McPherson. 15 Justice Marshall wrote for the 5-4
majority.' 5' Ardith McPherson was a clerk in Harris County Constable
Walter Rankin's office. Listening to the radio in the back room where
she worked, she and a co-worker heard news of the attempt to assas-
sinate President Reagan. They spoke critically of Reagan's domestic
policy and McPherson remarked, in effect, "[I]f they go for him again,
144. Id. at 151-54, 103 S. Ct. at 1692-94.
145. The Court stated: "The Pickering balance requires full consideration of the
government's interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to
the public." Id. at 150, 103 S. Ct. at 1692. But the Court made no mention of "effective
and efficient fulfillment of . . . responsibilities to the public" thereafter. Id. at 150-54,
103 S. Ct. at 1692-94. The Connick Court appears to have been more concerned about
protecting agency superiors' command-control authority than about agencies' actual
performance of public services. See Richard M. Fischl, Labor, Management, and the First
Amendment: Whose Rights are These Anyway, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 729 (1989).
146. See 461 U.S. at 151-52 nn.11-12, 103 S. Ct. at 1692-93 nn.11-12.
147. Id. at 150 n.10, 103 S. Ct. at 1692 n.10.
148. See id. See also infra text accompanying notes 200-04.
149. Prevailing in such cases became markedly more difficult. See First Amendment
Speech Rights, supra note 57, at 771-824; Public Employees' Free Speech, supra note
57, at 256-327; and From Connick to Confusion, supro note 126.
150. 483 U.S. 378, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987).
151. Id. at 379, 107 S. Ct. at 2894. Justice Powell joined the majority, but also wrote
a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 379, 392, 107 S. Ct. at 2894, 2901. Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and O'Con-
nor. Id. at 394, 107 S. Ct. at 2902.
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I hope they get him. ' ' 152 The remark was overheard and reported to
Rankin, who promptly fired McPherson. The district court twice upheld
the discharge; the Fifth Circuit twice reversed; and the Supreme Court
affirmed the Fifth Circuit's reversal."53
For the first time, the Supreme Court explicitly characterized the
inquiry into whether employee speech related to "a matter of public
concern" as "the threshold question.' ' 15 4 Applying Connick's new "con-
text" criterion, 155 the Court found that McPherson's "statement was
made in the course of a conversation addressing the policies of the
President's administration."'1 6 Whether a statement is "inappropriate
or controversial," the Court insisted, "is irrelevant to the question
whether it deals with a matter of public concern.' 1 7 That McPherson
had not attempted to "go public" was not even mentioned.158
As to "balancing," the Rankin court said, "[t]he State bears a burden
of justifying the discharge on legitimate grounds."' 59 Moreover, it
urged, courts must be vigilant in their balancing "to ensure that public
employers do not use authority over employees to silence discourse,
not because it hampers public functions but simply because superiors
disagree with the content of employees' speech.' ' 6 Although Mc-
Pherson's "speech" did not occur in the context of a "personal con-
frontation" with her superior, the Court applied Givhan's "manner,
time and place" along with Connick's new "context" criteria.'6 ' The
Court found no evidence that McPherson's remark actually had "inter-
fered with the efficient functioning of the office.''16 2 Moreover, her
discharge "was not based on any assessment by the Constable that the
remark demonstrated a character trait that made [her] unfit to perform
her work.'' 63
Consequently, the Court held that Constable Rankin's "interest in
discharging her" did not outweigh McPherson's First Amendment
"rights. ' ' 164 In contrast to Connick, Rankin seemed to require that
152. Id. at 381, 107 S. Ct. at 2895.
153. Id. at 382-83, 107 S. Ct. at 2896. The Supreme Court several times expressed
dissatisfaction with the district judge's "ambiguous" and "unintelligible" findings. Id.
at 381 n.3, 382 n.4, 385 n.8, 390 n.16, 107 S. Ct. at 2895 nn.3-4, 2897 n.8, 2900 n.16.
154. Id. at 384, 107 S. Ct. at 2897.
155. See supra text accompanying note 129.
156. 483 U.S. at 386, 107 S. Ct. at 2898.
157. Id. at 387, 107 S. Ct. at 2898.
158. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
159. 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S. Ct. at 2899.
160. Id. at 384, 107 S. Ct. at 2897.
161. Id. at 388-89, 107 S. Ct. at 2899.
162. Id. at 389, 107 S. Ct. at 2899.
163. Id. at 389, 107 S. Ct. at 2900-01. Compare Pickering, quoted supra text accom-
panying note 78.
164. 483 U.S. at 390-92, 107 S. Ct. at 2900-01. Unlike Connick, the Rankin Court
refers regularly to public employees' First Amendment "rights," not merely to their
"interests."
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Pickering defendants show that the subject speech adversely affected
actual agency operations, not merely such abstractions as "discipline,"
"authority," or "working relationships." ' 165 Moreover, the Rankin court
said nothing about crediting agency superiors' fears as to possible future
effects speech might have if events were allowed to unfold in lieu of
proof that actual interference had occurred. 1 6
F. Waters v. Churchill
In Rankin, there was no doubt as to the substance of the employee's
speech. 1 67 But what if the agency superior is uncertain as to what an
employee actually said? May she properly discipline (or punish) him
anyway? If a disciplined employee wishes to deny making an alleged
statement, is he entitled to trial on this critical fact question? These
were the core issues in the 1994 Supreme Court case, Waters v.
Churchill. 168 In addition to resolving these questions, on which the
Circuits had divided,1 6 9 the Waters court made other statements that
could affect public employee free speech jurisprudence. Justice O'Con-
nor wrote for the plurality.170
Cheryl Churchill was a public hospital obstetrics nurse. Cynthia
Waters was her supervisor. Churchill had at times expressed opposition
to a new policy which, in her view, risked assigning nurses to duties
which they were inadequately trained to perform. This staffing policy
had been initiated by the hospital's new vice president, Kathleen
Davis.171
A background incident occurred in 1986. It happened when the
Clinical Head of Obstetrics, Thomas Koch, M.D., the doctor on duty,
165. See supra text accompanying notes 162 & 163. See also 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.
Ct. at 289: "[Tlhe state interest element of the test focuses on the effective functioning
of the public employer's enterprise." Compare supra note 145 and accompanying text.
As to the problematics of such abstract state interests as employees' "loyalty" and
"harmony among co-workers" and such negative abstractions as "disloyalty" and "in-
subordination," see supra note 94, at 386-98.
166. Compare Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-54, 103 S. Ct. at 1692-94. The Court noted
that Rankin had testified that the possibility of interference with the functions of his
office "had not been a consideration" in his decision to fire McPherson. Rankin, 483
U.S. at 389. 107 S. Ct. at 2899.
167. See supra text accompanying note 152.
168. 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994). "In this case, we decide whether the Connick test should
be applied to what the government employer thought was said, or to what the trier of
fact ultimately determines to have been said." Id. at 1882. See also id. at 1884. See
generally, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech,
Press, and Association, 108 HARv. L. REV. 261, 280-90 (1994).
169. 114 S. Ct. at 1884.
170. She was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Souter and Ginsburg.
Justice Souter also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment in an opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Stevens dis-
sented, joined by Justice Blackmun. Id. at 1882, 1891, 1893.
171. Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1116-17 (7th Cir. 1992).
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ordered Mary Lou Ballew, a probationary nurse, to sound a "code
pink" medical emergency alert. Ballew "did not know what to do and
failed to alert all the necessary medical personnel.' '172 Koch next ordered
Churchill to prepare the delivery room and issued the "code pink"
alert himself. 173 Churchill then assisted Koch with the emergency sur-
gical procedure. While Churchill was helping Koch, Waters called to
her, ordering her to check on a patient. Churchill advised Waters that
she had already checked on the patient, adding, "You don't need to
tell me what to do." Churchill, however, checked the patient again as
ordered. Afterwards, Dr. Koch complained that Waters had interfered
with his operation. Waters refused to discuss the matter with Koch,
but met with Davis and hospital CEO Stephen Hopper, who issued
Churchill a "written warning" for her "insubordination" in telling
Waters, "You don't have to tell me how to do my job."1 74
Several months later, in a conversation with Melanie Perkins-Graham,
a nurse considering transferring to the obstetrics department, Churchill
allegedly made a number of critical comments about the department
and Waters. Ballew, nurse Jean Welty, and Dr. Koch overheard parts
of the conversation. Ballew later reported to Waters her recollection of
Churchill's comments "about you and how bad things are in OB in
general. ' ' 1 75 Waters later met with Ballew to obtain further particulars,
and Waters, together with Davis, then met with Perkins-Graham to
obtain her account of what Churchill had said. Davis and Waters fired
Churchill without consulting either her or Welty and Koch, the other
individuals who had overheard the conversation. 176 Churchill sued in
federal district court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging that the
defendants had violated her First Amendment right to free speech. 1 77
Two rounds of motions for summary judgment followed.178
Churchill contended that her conversation with Perkins-Graham pri-
marily concerned problems in the hospital nurses' training program
which, she believed, threatened adequate patient care and violated state
nursing regulations. Koch and Welty corroborated Churchill's ac-
count.17 9 The district court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the alternate grounds that Churchill did not speak about
172. Churchill v. Waters, 731 F. Supp. 311, 312-13 (C.D. Ill. 1990).
173. Id.
174. Waters, 977 F.2d at 1117-18. The court did not comment on the fact that there
were two versions of what Churchill had said on this occasion; that was not an issue in
the case.
175. Id. at 1882; 977 F.2d at 1118.
176. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1882-83. After she was fired, Churchill filed a grievance
which was rejected by Hopper, the hospital's CEO, after finally meeting with Churchill
to hear her version of the episode and reviewing some other reports. Id. at 1883.
177. Waters, 977 F.2d at 1119.
178. See id. at 1119-20. The district court's consideration of and rulings on the first
round are reported in Churchill v. Waters, 731 F. Supp. 311 (C.D. Ill. 1990). It is unclear
from the reported opinions whether trial had commenced.
179. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1883 (1994).
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a matter of public concern, and that even if she did, the potential for
disruption would have abrogated her First Amendment rights. 18o The
Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that under proper standards for sum-
mary judgment review, Churchill did speak about matters of public
concern-namely, the hospital's alleged "violation of state nursing
regulations" and the "quality and level of nursing care--and that her
speech was not disruptive.""' The Seventh Circuit remanded the case
to the district court for trial. The critical question to be determined on
remand was whether "the point of Churchill's conversation was to
raise the issues of inadequate nurse staffing resulting in inept patient
care and even danger to patients because of the ... training policy
rather than simply to complain," that is, whether Churchill's comments
related to a matter of public concern and therefore, were protected
under the First Amendment. 182
The Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit's judgment, but
remanded for further findings on the "material issue of disputed fact,"
that is, Churchill's superiors' "actual motivation:" whether her super-
iors "actually fired [her] . . . because of the disruptive things she had
said to Perkins-Graham," or because of "nondisruptive statements ...
they thought she may have made in the same conversation" and/or
earlier nondisruptive criticisms that may have constituted protected
speech. 183 In short, the Court remanded for trial on the basic, first-level
Mount Healthy causation question. 84 The Court said that because of its
"conclusion," it "need not" consider defendants' claim to qualified
immunity.'
18
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1884. See also Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1120-26 (7th Cir. 1992).
The appellate court stated, "We note that if the district court had considered the record
in the light most favorable to Churchill, it would have concluded that the 'history of
hostility between Churchill and her supervisors' to which it referred was nothing but a
one sided demonstration of hostility toward Churchill." Id. at 1125.
182. Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1127 (7th Cir. 1992), vacated, 114 S. Ct.
1878 (1994). The Supreme Court re-characterized the question on remand as if the
Seventh Circuit had said that the district court's "inquiry must turn on what the speech
actually was, not on what the employer thought it was." Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1884.
The Seventh Circuit actually stated, "[Ilt is immaterial whether the defendants knew (or
deliberately ignored) the precise content of Churchill's conversation ..... Compare
Waters, 977 F.2d at 1129.
183. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1891.
184. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
185. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1891. This reasoning suggests that in the Court's view, state
agency superiors could invoke qualified immunity only after the trial court determined
whether the employee had spoken on a matter of public concern, whether her speech
rights or interests outweighed any alleged interference with the agency's performance,
and whether the superiors had disciplined her because of that protected speech. The
Seventh Circuit earlier had rejected the defendants' qualified immunity claim: "[lit is
immaterial whether the defendants knew (or deliberately ignored) the precise content of
Churchill's conversation, for they knew or should have known from the state of the law
as of that date that they were terminating her for engaging in speech that may have been
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The plurality focused mainly on the question whether a public em-
ployee who had been "disciplined" or "punished"186 because of what
her superior thought she said, was entitled to a trial court's determi-
nation of what she actually said. The Court answered in the negative.
It reasoned that to require agency superiors to hold the equivalent of
due process review including notice and hearing would intrude too
much upon government's "efficiency concerns:"
18 7
The problem with the Court of Appeals' approach-under which
the facts to which the Connick test is applied are determined by
the judicial factfinder-is that it would force the government
employer to come to its factual conclusions through procedures
that substantially mirror the evidentiary rules used in court. The
government manager would have to ask not what conclusions she,
as an experienced professional, can draw from the circumstances,
but what conclusions a jury would later draw.188
That, the plurality felt, would create too much due process.18 9 Besides,
as the plurality observed, public and private employers often do act on
the basis of hearsay, impressions as to character, and other considera-
tions that may not be admissible in court.10 The implication was that
public employees' First Amendment rights should not impede their
superiors' going about business as usual. The Waters court never
focused on the critical issue that the Seventh Circuit had raised: whether
what Churchill had said addressed a matter of public concern.' 9 ' Since
protected under the First Amendment; and that the right of public employees to speak
out on matters of public concern was well established long before 1987." Waters, 977
F.2d at 1129.
186. The plurality used both expressions interchangeably.
187. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888.
188. Id.
189. The Court never has explained why public employees' free speech rights are not
protected by the same due process standards and procedures as their property rights.
First Amendment free speech rights are liberty interests. The Fourteenth Amendment
facially accords liberty and property rights the same due process protection. The Court
has, however, held that only property rights are entitled to such protection. Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972). See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 92 S. Ct. 2717 (1972). Faculty with tenure are considered to have a property
interest. See supra note 5, at 12-13 & 28-30. The Waters district court held that Churchill
had no property interest under state law. Waters, 731 F. Supp. at 318-20.
190. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1888. The dissent challenged the plurality's policy per-
spective: "The risk that a jury may ultimately view the facts differently from even a
conscientious employer, is not, as the plurality would have it, a needless fetter on public
employers' ability to discharge their duties. It is the normal means by which our legal
system protects legal rights and encourages those in authority to act with care. Here, for
example, attention to 'conclusions a jury would later draw' ... about the content of
Churchill's speech might have caused [defendants] to talk to Churchill about what she
said before deciding to fire her. There is nothing unfair or onerous about putting the
risk of error on an employer in these circumstances." Id. at 1900 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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Connick, the Court had maintained that whether an employee's speech
was of public concern was a question of law for the court. In Waters,
however, the Court seemed to imply that when the content of an
employee's speech is in doubt, the task of determining whether her
speech relates to a matter of public concern would be delegated to
agency superiors.
Nevertheless, the plurality held, agency superiors should not act on
the basis of hearsay and personal opinion. The Court's language, how-
ever, leaves some uncertainty as to what agency superiors should do
when uncertain about what was said. Good faith is one factor: "It is
necessary that the decisionmaker reach its conclusion about what was
said in good faith, rather than as a pretext; but it does not follow that
good faith is sufficient. '112 In addition, agency superiors must find the
facts "reasonably," and reviewing courts may determine whether or
not this was done.193 For example, it would be "unreasonable" for
superiors to base decisions on "no evidence at all" or on "extremely
weak evidence when strong evidence is clearly available. '1 94 A reason-
able superior must use "a certain amount of care" in reaching employ-
ment decisions, though not "the care with which trials, with their rules
of evidence and procedure, are conducted. ' ' 195 The plurality implied
that if agency superiors doubt what an employee said, they are required
to make a reasonable investigation. The plurality stated:
[I]f [defendants] really did believe [the allegations as to her speech]
and fired Churchill because of it, they must win. Their belief,
based on the investigation they conducted, would have been
entirely reasonable .... Management can spend only so much of
their time on any one employment decision. By the end of the
termination process, [the CEO], who made the final decision, had
the word of two trusted employees, the endorsement of those
employees' reliability by three hospital managers, and the benefit
of a face-to-face meeting with the employee he fired. With that in
hand, a reasonable manager could have concluded that no further
time needed to be taken. As respondents themselves point out,
"if the belief an employer forms supporting its adverse personnel
action is 'reasonable,' an employer has no need to investigate
further. "196
192. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1889.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. The Court did not suggest holding administrative law hearings as an alter-
native.
196. Id. at 1890. The plurality seemed unaware that in the "real" world of public
(like private) sector bureaucracy, an official's idea of a "good faith," "reasonable"
investigation may consist of consulting her immediate circle of cronies, dependably
subservient subordinates, and other sycophants. Waters offers plaintiff-employees little
protection from agency superiors who simply "go through the motions" of a pro forna
investigation while professing reasonableness and good faith.
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Taken out of context, the last sentence could be read to mean that an
agency superior's "reasonable belief" alone is a sufficient basis for
decision. Justice Souter, concurring separately, tried to clarify what
was required: "I add these words to emphasize that, in order to avoid
liability, the public employer must not only reasonably investigate the
third-party report, but must also actually believe it."'' 1 7 Presumably, the
other members of the plurality would agree. The plurality thought,
however, that it was enough for superiors to give the accused employee
an opportunity to be heard only after firing her.18
Waters appears to stand for the proposition that if public agency
superiors are unsure what an employee actually said, they can never-
theless go ahead and fire (or otherwise punish) her for speaking-
whether or not what she said related to a matter of public concern and
whether or not her First Amendment rights would have outweighed
agency efficiency interests-so long as they made some "reasonable"
inquiry into what she said. Having done so, they must then only believe
in good faith that what she said was not a matter of public concern,
or if so, reasonably believe that it was so disruptive as to outweigh her
First Amendment right to say it. Agency superiors who could prove
that they had acted in good faith pursuant to a reasonable investigation
now were free to act on the basis of rumors or false statements made
by persons harboring some personal grudge against the alleged speaker.
The employee-speaker no longer would have the right to ask a court
to determine what she actually said, whether what she actually said
was a matter of public concern, or whether what she actually said had
affected or reasonably could have been expected to adversely affect
agency operations. Whether an investigation was reasonable, and whether
superiors believed what they thought the speaker had said now would
be the only issues subject to judicial review. The court did not say
whether these were questions of fact or questions of law. 99
The Court added, "[a]s a matter of law," even if Churchill's comments
related to "a matter of public concern," their "potential disruptiveness
... as reported was enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment
value [her speech] might have had. ' 20 0 This is a strange statement. The
197. Id. at 1891 (Souter, J., concurring).
198. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890. It did not seem to occur to the plurality that by this
point, superiors normally would feel inclined to justify decisions they already made or
to ratify decisions made by loyal administrators below them in the chain of command,
and disinclined to attend seriously to information that would question the wisdom or
fairness of such previous decisions.
199. Justice Scalia suggested that these might be jury questions. Id. at 1897 (Scalia,
I., concurring).
200. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890-91. Like the Connick Court, the Waters Court seemed
more concerned about protecting agency superiors' sense of importance and power than
in actually promoting an agency's performance of public services. See supra note 145
and accompanying text; see also infra note 204. Compare these cases with Moore v. City
of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003, 110 S. Ct. 562
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posture of the case before the Court was the review of the Circuit
Court's reversal of the district court's grant of summary judgment for
defendants.201 The facts had not yet been developed at trial. The
plurality, however, felt comfortable in proceeding to balance the com-
peting interests "as a matter of law." Earlier in the opinion, the Court
had intimated that whether an instance of speech was likely to be
disruptive is a fact question, and had stated that in many situations,
defendant agency superiors would be required to "make a substantial
showing" that the speech in question was "likely to be disruptive"
before they constitutionally could punish employee speakers.202 Never-
theless, the Court made no effort to assess the nature or extent of
Churchill's speech interest or right, but summarily dismissed as a
nominal featherweight "whatever First Amendment value it might have
had."203 Nor did the Court factor the speech's importance to the public
into its purported Pickering balancing.204
(1989) and Berdin v. Duggan, 701 F.2d 909 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893, 104
S. Ct. 239 (1983) (both courts considered the extent to which protected speech actually
affected an agency's performance of public services).
201. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1883-84.
202. Id. The Court also stated, "In many such situations the government may have to
make a substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive before it
may be punished." Id. at 1887 (citing Rankin, Connick, and Pickering as authority for
this proposition). The Waters Court did not explicitly state that an agency superior's
expectation of future disruption must be "reasonable" in order to serve as a constitutional
counter-weight. However, it did not recede from Connick's requirement to that effect.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text. That requirement presumably remains in
force.
203. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890-91. Like Myers, see supra text accompanying notes
112-14, Churchill, as a responsible professional, clearly had an interest in the propriety
and effectiveness of policies and practices where she worked. See infra note 204. It may
or may not be only coincidental that these discharged professional employees were
women.
204. Compare the Supreme Court's failure to consider the importance of the speech
with Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1125 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Churchill's interest in
fulfilling her duties and obligations as an ethical, responsible professional ... clearly
outweighs the hospital's interests in interfering and ultimately preventing her from
speaking out on important matters of public concern."). The appellate court stated, "It
is most disheartening to witness this scenario of combat and distrust occurring in far too
many hospitals today across our country [which] is achieving nothing, but to exacerbate
the nation's health care problems[,J for hospital administrators are all too often turning
a deaf ear to the needs and recommendations of the medical and nursing staffs .... This
conflict does nothing for, and in fact interferes with and stifles, the health professional's
interest and dedication in rendering the optimum of well-accepted patient care." Id. at
1129.
Those who experience their own importance through exercising power over others may
tend to identify with persons in positions of authority. This tendency may have been a
factor in the Court's arguably excessive deference to agency superiors in Waters, as in
Connick. Similarly, from the standpoint of such superior employees, lower ranking
employees perceived as encroaching upon the status of their superiors, e.g., by discussing
ways the agency might operate more effectively or by criticizing their superiors' policies
or practices, should be fired, regardless of how much they may contribute.
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Having decided that the Pickering scales tipped against Churchill,
the Court nevertheless upheld the Seventh Circuit's reversal of the trial
court's grant of summary judgment, remanding for further proceed-
ings. 20 5 On remand, the district court was to determine whether the
defendants had fired Churchill because of constitutionally protected,
non-disruptive statements she may have made either during the subject
conversation or earlier.216 Evidently the Court did not mean that its
conclusion "of law" about Churchill's speech applied to all of her
comments during the "conversation. ' 20 7 Since the Court had made a
point of saying that it had not determined whether her reported com-
ments had addressed matters of public concern, 208 it is unclear why the
Court balanced the comments against their alleged "disruptiveness.'2 0 9
As the Waters Court itself noted, only speech relating to hiatters of
public concern on the basis of which a defendant superior acted was
to be "balanced" against purported interference with agency effi-
ciency. 210 Based on its own holding in the case, the Waters Court also
should have remanded for determination as to whether defendants had
conducted a reasonable investigation into what Churchill actually said,
and whether they really believed the results of that investigation.
Perhaps it thought that these questions would be addressed in the
course of the "further proceedings."
It was "in light of Waters v. Churchill" that the Supreme Court
vacated and remanded Jeffries 1.211 The Court did not indicate what
aspects of Waters it thought were relevant to lower court review.
IV. JEFFRIES V. HARLESTON
Numerous issues arose in connection with this litigation. The district
court wrote four separate published opinions in 1993.212 In 1994, the
205. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1891 (1994).
206. Id. It was not clear how the Court would determine this without deciding at trial
what Churchill actually had said. As of November 27, 1995, there had been no report of
the case on remand.
207. See supra text accompanying note 200.
208. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890.
209. Id. at 1890-91.
210. Id. at 1891.
211. Harleston v. Jeffries, 115 S. Ct. 502, 503 (1994). As to Waters' "muddying the
waters," see Terrence Leas & Charles J. Russo, Waters v. Churchill: Autonomy for the
Academy or Freedom for the Individual?, 93 EDUC. L. REP. 1099 (1994) (considering
possible implications for academic freedom jurisprudence). As if the Waters' plurality
opinion were insufficiently ambiguous, West headnote writers added two classic typo-
graphical errors. Headnote one reads, "[Tlhe employee's interest in expressing herself
... must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to the interest of the
state ... in promoting the deficiency of public service it performs ... " Id. at 1878
(emphasis added). Headnote eight reads, "Government's interest in achieving its goal as
effectively and officially as possible is elevated . . . to a significant one when it acts as
an employer." Id. at 1879 (emphasis added). The latter error aptly may portray the
plurality's underlying, perhaps unconscious, assumptions concerning public sector labor-
management relations.
212. Jeffries v. Harleston, 820 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Jeffries v. Harleston, 820
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Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.213 The
Supreme Court then granted certiorari and vacated the Second Circuit's
judgment.214 Early in 1995, the Second Circuit published its second
opinion, this time reversing the district court, and the Supreme Court
this time denied certiorari. 215
Leonard Jeffries, a tenured professor at the City University of New
York (CUNY), had chaired CUNY's Black Studies Department since
1972.216 Without waiting for formal Board of Trustees approval, CUNY
President Bernard Harleston wrote Jeffries on July 1, 1991, notifying
him of his reappointment to another three-year term as Chair.217 On
July 20, Jeffries appeared at a conference in Albany.
Jeffries spoke for more than an hour, primarily criticizing the
racial and ethnic biases he perceived in the public school curric-
ulum. During the speech, Jeffries made several comments about
Jews that were hateful and repugnant. For example, Jeffries launched
several ad hominem invectives at specific state and federal officials
who supported the curriculum, calling one an "ultimate, supreme,
sophisticated, debonair racist," and a "sophisticated, Texas Jew."
Jeffries also told his audience that Jews had a history of oppressing
blacks. He said that "rich Jews" had financed the slave trade, and
that Jews and Mafia figures in Hollywood had conspired to "put
together a system of destruction of black people" by portraying
them negatively in films. 218
The speech was featured in both Albany and New York City media.
Afterwards, Harleston and other CUNY officials set about to remove
Jeffries from the chairmanship. Harleston asked the Provost and Social
Sciences Dean to review Jeffries' performance as Chairman since his
July 1 reappointment. Both reported that he was meeting his depart-
mental responsibilities. Nevertheless, without investigating whether
Jeffries' Albany speech was likely to have any adverse effect on Uni-
versity operations, Harleston recommended to the Board that Jeffries'
reappointment be scaled back to a one-year term. The Board approved,
and Harleston notified Jeffries of the Board's decision. In the letter,
Harleston stated that the speech "threatened recruitment, fundraising,
F. Supp. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Jeffries v. Harleston, 820 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
213. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Jeffries I, aff'g in
part and vacating in part, Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
214. Harleston v. Jeffries, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994).
215. Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 173 (1995)
[hereinafter Jeffries IT).
216. Jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at 1241.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1242.
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and CUNY's relationship with the community.' '219 The Board later
unanimously approved Jeffries' replacement. Jeffries then sued Harles-
ton and other CUNY officials, contending that his removal from the
chairmanship violated his First Amendment speech right. 220
A. In the District Court
Responding to numerous motions for summary judgment and other
preliminary and post-trial motions by both parties, the district court
presented its several sets of findings and conclusions in a series of four
reported decisions. At the beginning, both parties agreed that Jeffries'
speech was protected by the First Amendment, but defendants argued
that their decision to end Jeffries' chairmanship was based entirely on
other considerations.221 Defendants also asked the court to find that
they were entitled to qualified immunity. Jeffries claimed that CUNY
officials had been motivated solely, or at least partly, on the basis of
his speech, and moved for an injunction ordering his reinstatement as
Chairman. Finding the underlying facts "quite unsettled," the court
denied both parties' motions for summary judgment.222
The court's second opinion dealt with defendants' contention that
the anti-semitic portions of Jeffries' speech did not relate to matters of
public concern and, therefore, were unprotected.223 Citing Rankin224
and cases from other circuits, 221 the court held that those comments
had been "made in the context of and were part of a speech concerning
a matter of public concern," and that, accordingly, "Jeffries' whole
speech, each and every sentence, is constitutionally protected. "226
In its third opinion, 227 the court decided the major substantive issues.
The jury had made several factual findings, including: (1) that Jeffries'
Albany speech "was a substantial or motivating factor" in defendants'
decision to end his chairmanship; (2) that defendants failed to prove
that they would have taken the same action if Jeffries had not made
the speech; (3) that defendants failed to prove that the speech "ham-
pered" the institution's "effective and efficient operation;" and (4) that
defendants were, however, "motivated in their actions by a reasonable
expectation" that the speech "would cause the disruption of the effec-
tive and efficient operation of the . . . Department, the College, or the
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1243. See Nathan Glazer, Levin, Jeffries, and the Fate of Academic Auton-
omy, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 703 (1995) (providing additional factual background).
221. Jeffries, 820 F. Supp. at 737.
222. Id. at 737, 739.
223. Id. at 739, 740-41.
224. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987).
225. The court cited Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1003, 110 S. Ct. 512 (1989); and Eiland v. City of Montgomery, 797 F.2d 953
(11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020, 107 S. Ct. 3263 (1987).
226. Jeffries, 820 F. Supp. at 740-41.
227. Id. at 741.
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University. ' 228 Based on these findings,229 the court proceeded to apply
the Pickering balancing. The court found that the Albany speech was
"part of an ongoing debate" concerning "the reform of the educational
curriculum" in the nation's classrooms, particularly in regard to "the
multicultural values and experiences of different minorities in the
United States. ' ' 2 30 Thus "the speech substantially involved matters of
public concern and 'should be accorded significant weight in the
Pickering balance.' ",231
The court then was left to answer the question of how to assess the
University's interests. Because the jury found that the speech had no
actual adverse effects, the only question was whether the jury's finding
that defendants had "a reasonable expectation" that the speech "would
cause disruption" in the future was "enough to overcome plaintiff's
first amendment rights.' '232 The district court noted that several circuit
courts, including the Second Circuit, had read Connick to mean that
"where a public employee's speech substantially involves matters of
public concern, the defendants must show actual hampering of the
effective and efficient operation of the governmental services in order
to outweigh the employee's first amendment rights.' '233 Thus defen-
dants' "reasonable expectation" that the speech would cause disruption
was not enough to outweigh speech that "substantially involved matters
of public concern." 234 Connick had held that when an agency superior
acts based on her expectation of disruption, "a stronger showing may
be necessary if the employee's speech more substantially involved
matters of public concern.- 235 As a result of its Pickering balancing,
the district court concluded that the University's denial of Jeffries' "full
three-year term" violated his First Amendment rights. It remained for
the jury to consider individual liabilities and damages .236
The court's fourth opinion 23 7 responded to various motions by the
parties and set out remedies. Briefly,238 the court held that defendants
228. Id. at 742.
229. The district court noted that Second Circuit "authority" was unclear "as to the
obligation of trial courts to make factual determinations when balancing the Pickering
factors." Id. at 743 n.1. The court said it made "an independent review of the evidence"
and "agree[d] with the jury's factual findings." Id.
230. Id. at 742.
231. Id. at 743. In Connick, the Supreme Court stated that racial discrimination is "a
matter inherently of public concern." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.8, 103 S.
Ct. 1684, 1691 n.8 (1983).
232. Jeffries, 820 F. Supp. at 743.
233. Id.
234. Id. (emphasis added) (citing, inter al., Piesco v. City of New York, 933 F.2d
1149, 1159-60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991)). As to the Piesco court's
formulations, see infro note 256. The court also cited Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuit holdings. Id.
235. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152, 103 S. Ct. at 1692. See also id. at 150, 150 n.9, 103
S. Ct. at 1692, 1692 n.9. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
236. Jeffries, 820 F. Supp. at 744.
237. Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
238. The detailed opinion extends thirty-two pages.
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failed to offer "convincing, firsthand proof at trial" that either the
speech or the professor had adversely affected university or classroom
functions. 239 The district court stated:
It is unequivocally clear, under our Constitution, and the law
enunciated on the subject by the United States Supreme Court,
and in the light of the factual record developed in this case, that
the action taken by the University was constitutionally impermis-
sible. This is and must be the case, in spite of the hateful,
poisonous and reprehensible statements made by the professor in
the speech in question. This need not have been the case if the
University had offered convincing, firsthand proof at trial that
either the consequences of the speech disrupted the campus,
classes, administration, fund-raising or faculty relations, or that
the professor had turned his classroom into a forum for bizarre,
shallow, racist and incompetent pseudo-thinking and pseudo-
teaching. While a few shards of hearsay or self-serving evidence
were offered halfheartedly by the University to suggest potentially
viable defenses along these lines, the University cannot escape the
astonishing picture it painted for the jury: high public and aca-
demic officials swearing under oath that they had removed the
professor for tardiness in arriving at class and sending in his
grades, and for asserted brutish behavior which had been either
ignored or condoned by the University.240
Moreover, the court found that the University had failed to make any
effort to assess potential future harm to the institution:
[Defendants might, for instance, have reviewed] whether Professor
Jeffries could effectively interact as Chairman with faculty mem-
bers, and specifically, Jewish faculty members, whether the racist
and bigoted nature of Professor Jeffries' remarks would stigmatize
and isolate the Black Studies Department, and make it a parochial
backwater of the College, and whether the College's alumni would
withdraw their financial support in light of the professional em-
barrassment Professor Jeffries represented as a formal leader of the
College administration. Such a vital inquiry was never made, either
through ignorance or cowardice. 241
The court endorsed the jury's findings as to punitive damages. 242 The
court also ordered Jeffries reinstated as Chair of the Black Studies
238. The detailed opinion extends thirty-two pages.
239. Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1071-72.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1075. See also id. at 1082.
if42. Id. at 1072. "[Tlhe ... punitive damage award [was] made by the jury in justifiable
di gust with the conduct of the University officials who did not act, then acted for the
wrong reason, then were dishonest about their motivations in testimony before the jury."
Id. See also id. at 1092-93.
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Department for the remaining two years, provided that the University
could remove him from either the classroom or the chairmanship "if a
good cause basis for finding abusive or indecent behavior is adequately
established.-243 Such conduct in the future, the court observed, also
could jeopardize Jeffries' tenured status.24 4
The court held that the jury's award of punitive damages could be
read consistently with its earlier finding that defendants had reasonably
expected that Jeffries' speech would disrupt future University opera-
tions.245 The court denied defendants' qualified immunity defense,
finding that defendants had "violated clearly established ... consti-
tutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. "246 In
reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that defendants should
have known both from Rankin and from prior Second Circuit jurispru-
dence that public employees might not be fired "in retaliation for
speech that substantially involves matters of public concern and . ..
does not interfere with the efficient functioning of their employers'
office.'"247
The district court concluded by noting that "the United States Con-
stitution broadly protects academic freedom," and by quoting from
Keyishian.24s The court pointed out, however, that such protection does
not extend to any and all kinds of speech:
[T]he Constitution does not prevent a University from taking
disciplinary action against a professor who engages in a systematic
pattern of racist, anti-semitic, sexist, and homophobic remarks
during class .... Nor does the Constitution protect the right of a
professor to teach patently absurd and wholly fallacious theories
in class .... This Order does not require City University to con-
tinue to disserve its own students by subjecting them in class to
243. Id. at 1072. See also id. at 1093-98. In that case, however, the court caustically
observed, "the University . . . ought to concern itself with such matters as witnesses,
. . . records, affidavits and the like, and not rely on pious press releases and hearsay-
ridden, elliptical, hand-wringing memoranda from academic deans." Id. The court
suggested that the University might have acted permissibly on the basis of Jeffries' other
conduct, but observed that the University had failed to preserve adequate records or to
present admissible evidence at trial. See id. at 1075-77, 1097. "While there may have
been compelling and legitimate grounds upon which to discipline Professor Jeffries, the
University chose to act upon illegitimate and unconstitutional grounds." Id. at 1098.
244. Id. at 1072.
245. Id. at 1084-85.
246. Id. at 1072. See also id. at 1085-92.
247. Id. at 1087. As to Rankin, see supra text accompanying notes 150-66. The court
cited another recent case involving CUNY, Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992), and also cited
Piesco v. City of New York, 933 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331
(1991), in support of this conclusion. Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1086-87.
248. Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1097. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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the bigoted statements and absurd theories of any of its profes-
sors .249
The Supreme Court had already suggested in Pickering, that if "a
teacher's public statements [were] so without foundation as to call into
question his fitness to perform his duties in the classroom," such
statements could evidence lack of competence that would justify ap-
propriate personnel action. 25 0 However, because the University had
based its action on constitutionally impermissible grounds, the court
held that Jeffries' First Amendment rights must be vindicated.51
B. Before the Second Circuit: Jeffries I
In April, 1994, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's hold-
ings in favor of Jeffries, except for the punitive damages award.252 On
that matter, the Second Circuit held that the jury's findings could not
be reconciled. Defendants could not have acted both on the basis of a
"reasonable expectation" that the Albany speech would disrupt the
University's "effective and efficient operation," and at the same time
"with malicious intent or reckless indifference" as to Jeffries and his
rights.253 Specifically, the Second Circuit upheld the district court's
determinations that defendants had violated Jeffries' First Amendment
free speech right and that they were not shielded from personal liability
by qualified immunity. 254
The critical issue was how the Pickering scales were to be weighted.
The Second Circuit read Connick as saying that the question of "[hiow
much interference the government must show to justify sanctioning an
employee for his speech will vary, depending on the degree that the
249. Id. at 1097-98. The 1940 Statement likewise set limits to the scope of academic
freedom: "When [college and university teachers) speak or write as citizens, they should
be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position in the
community imposes special obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they should
remember that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their
utterances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate
restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort
to indicate that they are not speaking for the institution." Policy Documents and Reports,
supra notes 1, at 4. In regard to this policy statement, see also id. at 6, "1970 Interpretive
Comments," and id. at 32, "Committee A Statement on Extramural Utterances." See also
Glazer, supra note 220, at 708-09.
250. See supra text accompanying note 78; see also supra notes 98-99 and accompa-
nying text.
251. Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1098. See also supra note 243. In addition to reinstatement
as chair, the court awarded Jeffries $360,000 in punitive damages. Jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at
1241.
252. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1241 (2d Cir.), vacated, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994).
253. Id. at 1249-50. The court remanded for a new trial on the punitive damages issue.
Id.
254. Id. at 1241. The court also upheld the district court's reinstatement order. Id. at
1241, 1249.
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speech involved matters of public concern. ' '2 55 Under Second Circuit
case law, this formulation meant that if "the speech substantially
addressed public issues, the government must show the statements
'actually undermined the effective and efficient operation' of the em-
ployee's department. '-25r The Second Circuit panel agreed that Jeffries'
speech "substantially concerned public issues.1 257 A page earlier, con-
struing Rankin,251 it also had written: "[W]hen a public employee
expresses an opinion on a matter of social or political concern, even if
critical of the very government that employs him, his employer cannot
sanction him unless his speech has impaired the efficiency of govern-
ment operations. "259 Evidently the Jeffries I panel believed that speech
on social or political matters necessarily substantially related to matters
of public concern. The panel therefore held that in order to prevail on
Pickering balancing, defendants would have to "shoulder the weightier
burden of showing that the speech caused substantial disruption at
CUN. "260
It is unclear how the panel understood the relation between the
Second Circuit's requirement that, in such cases, superiors must show
255. Id. at 1246 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 146, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983)).
256. Id. (citing Piesco v. City of New York, 933 F.2d 1149, 1159 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991)). Although the Second Circuit did not explicitly mention
actual interference in Piesco, the Jeffries district court and the Jeffries I appellate court
appear to have been correct in understanding that it had so intended.
The Piesco court variously characterized the employee's speech as "substantially"
involving matters of public concern that consequently were "entitled to great weight";
relating to "matters of significant public interest"; "so clearly" touching "on matters of
public concern"; having "clear public interest value"; relating to "matters of great public
concern"; having "significant first amendment value"; and being "of significant public
concern." Piesco, 933 F.2d at 1157-58, 1160-61. To outweigh such speech, the Piesco
court said that the government must "demonstrate interference with the efficient func-
tioning of the workplace" or "prov[e] interference with [the agency's] efficient opera-
tions." Id. at 1160-61. The court also stated, "[T]he City has failed to carry its burden
of proving harm to the [agency's] efficient functioning," and that the city failed to
present any evidence of harm resulting from Dr. Piesco's testimony. Id.
257. Jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at 1246. The court also found that Jeffries' speech involved
public issues "suffused with social and political hues." Id. at 1245. The Connick court
had failed to state clearly whether its formulation(s) referred to the percentage of the
speech that related to matters of public concern, or to speech that related to important
matters of public concern. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
258. 483 U.S. at 379-80, 383, 107 S. Ct. at 2894-95, 2896.
259. Jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at 1245 (emphasis added). In a parenthetical, the panel
summarized Piesco as meaning that a "city official cannot be fired for publicly criticizing
her own department where there is no evidence that her statements actually hampered
the department's functioning." Id. (citing 933 F.2d at 1159-60). This summary omitted
the recurrent language in Piesco referring to speech "substantially" involving matters of
pfiblic concern or of "significant" public concern, which the Jeffries I panel elsewhere
noted triggered the requirement that superiors prove actual harm to agency efficiency.
See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
260. Jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at 1246. "[T]o rebut Jeffries' prima facie case, the defendants
must show substantial interference." Id. at 1247. The court cited no authority for this
new "substantial" disruption or interference test.
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that employee speech actually interfered with their agency's "effective
and efficient operations ' ' 261 and this new "substantive disruption"
requirement. By "substantial disruption" it presumably had in mind
at least actual disruption. Reviewing the record, the panel noted that
defendants had offered only "meager evidence at best" that Jeffries'
speech had "any real disruptive effect" on the University's opera-
tions. 26 2 Moreover, the panel found that defendants had failed to show
"how Jeffries, by virtue of his position as department chair, could
undermine" its mission by his Albany speech.263 It is unclear whether
the panel meant that it would have considered defendants' purported
expectation that the speech could have had some adverse future effects
if there had been supporting record evidence. Not only was there no
such evidence, but defendants also had failed to provide more than
"meager evidence at best" as to actual disruption. The Second Circuit,
therefore, easily affirmed the district court's finding of a First Amend-
ment violation.264
Similarly, the Second Circuit readily agreed that defendants were not
entitled to qualified immunity:
By July 20, 1991, both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit
had held repeatedly that, absent a disruption of government op-
erations, a public employer may not sanction an employee for
speaking on issues of social or political importance. 265
Here again, the panel seemed to equate speech on "issues of social or
political concern" with speech that "substantially addressed public
concern." 26 The panel's reasoning was less clearly articulated than the
district court's; apart from the punitive damages issue, however, both
courts agreed as to results and general rationale. In the context of then
current Supreme Court and Second Circuit jurisprudence, Jeffries looked
like an easy case.
C. Vacated and Remanded "In Light of Waters"
Late in 1994, in a memorandum decision, the Supreme Court granted
defendants' petition for writ of certiorari and vacated and remanded
the case "for further consideration in light of Waters v. Churchill. '26 7
As if the import of Waters would be obvious, the Court did not specify
261. See supra text accompanying note 256.
262. Jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at 1247.
263. Id. (emphasis added).
264. Id. at 1248.
265. Id. See also Dube v. State Univ. of New York, 900 F.2d 587, 596-98 (2d. Cir.
1990) (university officials not eligible for qualified immunity for retaliation against African
Studies professor whose classroom speech characterized Zionism as a form of racism).
266. Jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at 1245-46.
267. Harleston v. Jeffries, 115 S. Ct. 502, 503 (1994).
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how Waters was to apply. The Second Circuit had decided Jeffries I
on April 18, 1994.268 The Supreme Court decided Waters six weeks
later.26
9
No doubt existed concerning what Jeffries had said,270 and thus no
occasion arose for the court to inquire into the officials' "reasonable
investigation" or "reasonable beliefs"-the core issues in Waters. 271
Moreover, the Waters Court gave no indication that it intended to
overrule or recede from Connick's formulation(s), according to which
a government superior's "burden in justifying a particular [sanction]
varies depending upon the nature" or "importance" of the employee's
speech.272 In Waters, the Court prematurely273 had undertaken to weigh
the "First Amendment value" of Churchill's speech against its "poten-
tial disruption.' 2 74 The Court, however, gave no indication that it
viewed Churchill's comments as having "substantially concerned" pub-
lic issues.2 75 Clearly, a majority of the Court disapproved Jeffries I's
result.276 The Court, however, gave no clue whatsoever as to what the
Second Circuit should have learned from Waters in the course of its
"further consideration."
D. In the Second Circuit Again: Jeffries If
On remand, the Second Circuit reversed the district court and in-
structed it to enter judgment for defendants.277 The same panel decided
both Jeffries I and Jeffries 11.278 The panel's reasoning in Jeffries II can
be mapped as follows: (1) In the panel's view, Waters meant that even
268. Jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at 1238.
269. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994).
270. Jeffries v. Harleston,. 52 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 173 (1995).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 167-211.
272. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 200-11.
274. See supra text accompanying note 200.
275. Nor did the Supreme Court inquire whether she had spoken on "a matter of
social or political concern." See supra text accompanying notes 258-60.
276. Otherwise, of course, the Supreme Court would not have vacated that decision.
In earlier cases, the Supreme Court had created new law in order to avoid what it
considered bad results. The Mt. Healthy court, concerned that a teacher who had made
"obscene gestures" might be given tenure, invented a second chance for superiors found
to have violated employees' speech rights. See supra text accompanying notes 86-101.
The Connick majority, troubled that an assistant district attorney dared to question some
of her superiors' policies, invoked several new ways of narrowing protected speech,
while adding that superiors might now claim-absent actual interference with agency
operations-that they "reasonably expected" such speech would result in future inter-
ference. See supra text accompanying notes 112-48. See also Waters, supra text accom-
panying notes 167-211.
277. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 173
(1995).
278. The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland and Joseph
M. McLaughlin, and District Judge Ellen Bree Bums, sitting by designation. Judge
McLaughlin wrote for the court both times.
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when public employees' speech merits "the greatest constitutional
protection," agency superiors need only "make a substantial showing
of likely interference," not of "actual disruption," in order to prevail
on Pickering balancing.279 (2) At trial, defendants had "made a sub-
stantial showing" that their decision to shorten Jeffries' term "was
based upon a reasonable prediction" that his "Albany speech would
disrupt University operations.""28 (3) As a matter of law, such potential
disruption outweighed "whatever First Amendment value the Albany
speech might have had."281 (4) Waters "permits a government employer
to fire an employee for speaking on a matter of public concern" if the
action was based on "the employer's [reasonable] prediction of disrup-
tion," if it was not taken "in retaliation for the speech." 28 2 (5) Applying
this prediction/retaliation distinction, the panel found that a majority
of the defendants who voted to reduce Jeffries' term "were motivated
by a reasonable prediction of disruption," not by "an improper retali-
atory motive. ' 28 3 The panel reasoned, therefore, that "elementary prin-
ciples of causation compel the conclusion that Jeffries' First Amendment
rights were not violated. ' '284 (6) Although academic freedom is an
important First Amendment concern, Jeffries' academic freedom was
not affected because he had "no greater public contact" as chairman
than as an "ordinary" professor; he was "still a tenured professor at
CUNY," and defendants did not seek "to silence him, or otherwise
limit his access to the 'marketplace of ideas' in the classroom. ' 285 This
reasoning presents several analytical problems. Each of these enumer-
ated steps now will be considered separately.
1. Speech Entitled to "The Greatest Constitutional Protection"
The Jeffries II court's reading of Waters exaggerated its already con-
siderable easing of agency superiors' Pickering burden. Waters actually
said:
[A] government employee, like any citizen, may have a strong,
legitimate interest in speaking out on public matters. In many
such situations the government may have to make a substantial
showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive before
it may be punished. 286
279. Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at 13.
280. Id. at 10.
281. Id. at 13.
282. Id. (citing Churchill v. Waters, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887, 1889-91 (1994)) (emphasis
added). "Waters permits a government employer to fire an employee for speaking on a
matter of public concern if ... the employer took action against the employee based on
[the employer's prediction of] disruption and not in retaliation for the speech." Id.
283. Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at 13-14.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 14-15.
286. Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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This statement was simply a variation on Connick's formulation con-
cerning future possible disruption;27 it was not new law. Waters did
not refer to speech meriting "the greatest constitutional protection."
Nor did Waters rule that "a substantial showing" that the speech in
question is "likely to be disruptive" will always or necessarily trump
employee speech interests, let alone those entitled to "the greatest
constitutional protection."
Waters nowhere considered, much less decided, whether agency
superiors' "reasonable" concerns or predictions of future disruption
could outweigh employee speech that, under Connick, "more substan-
tially involved matters of public concern." 288 Curiously, the Jeffries II
court ignored or misrepresented the Piesco standard that it earlier had
applied in Jeffries I when weighing on Pickering scales: "If . . . the
speech substantially addressed public issues, the government must
show the statements 'actually undermined the effective and efficient
operation' of the employee's department. "289 What Waters called a
"strong, legitimate interest in speaking out on public matters" is not
necessarily the same thing as speech that "more substantially involve[s]
matters of public concern," or speech meriting "the greatest constitu-
tional protection." Confronted with the need to second-guess the Su-
preme Court's unexplained rejection of Jeffries I, the panel evidently
assumed that it had to abandon its Piesco-Jeffries I standard. 290
2. "A Substantial Showing"
Nothing in the district court's opinions or Jeffries I suggested that at
trial defendants had come close to making "a substantial showing"
that their action "was based on a reasonable prediction" that the Albany
speech would disrupt the University's functioning. The district court
in fact had chastised University officials for failing to develop relevant
findings on this point.29' Defendants initially had claimed that Jeffries'
speech had "played no role" in their decision to terminate his chair-
287. See supra note 138 and text accompanying notes 137-40.
288. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 146, 152, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1693. See supra note
138 and text accompanying notes 137-40.
289. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d at 1238, 1246 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Piesco, 933 F.2d
at 1159). See supra note 256 and accompanying text. Referring to Jeffries I, the panel
incorrectly stated, "We expressly held that a mere reasonable belief that the speech
would interfere with the employer's operations is not enough to discipline an employee,
unless the employee holds a high-level, policy making position." Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at
12.
290. The panel commented, "The recent Waters decision ... has loosened Piesco's
shackles upon public employers." Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at 12. The panel may also have
been uncertain as to its own rationale in Jeffries I. See supra notes 257 & 259-60 and
text accompanying notes 258-66. Other circuits also required superiors to make a stronger
showing of disruption when the employee's speech "substantially involves matters of
public concern." See, e.g., Hall v. School Dist., 31 F.3d 183, 194-95 (4th Cir. 1994).
291. See supra note 242 and text accompanying notes 239-41.
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manship.292 Jeffries I had stated that "the Board, with no evidence that
Jeffries' performance was deficient or that the speech threatened to
harm CUNY, voted to limit Jeffries' term. 29 3 The Jeffries I panel also
held that defendants had failed to "demonstrate a reasonable expecta-
tion that Jeffries' speech would eventually cause disruption."' 214 The
Jeffries II court did not explain how it now concluded that defendants
had made the required "substantial showing" after all.295
3. The Weight or Importance of Jeffries' Speech in the Pickering The
Balance
The Jeffries II panel did not attempt to evaluate the significance or
importance of Jeffries' speech, either to himself or to the public. Instead,
borrowing language from Waters, the panel dismissed inquiry regarding
its weight as irrelevant: "[A]s a matter of law, [its] potential disrup-
tiveness was enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment value the
Albany speech might have had. ' ' 2 6 As in Waters, such dismissive
language implies that public employee speech has only nominal value.
Nor did the court engage in any particularized Pickering balancing: it
merely announced this conclusory result without explanation. This
conclusion is all the more remarkable because the panel also failed to
identify-much less assess-the nature and extent of the speech's pur-
ported "disruptiveness."
4. The "Retaliation"/"Prevent Future Disruption" Dichotomy
Although Jeffries II cited Waters for a distinction between firing an
employee to avoid future "disruption" and doing so "in retaliation"
292. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
293. Jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at 1246 (emphasis added).
294. Id. at 1246-47.
295. The panel noted, as it had in Jeffries 1, that the jury had found that defendants
"were 'motivated' to demote Jeffries by a 'reasonable expectation' that the Albany speech
would harm CUNY." Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at 13. Perhaps the panel now considered the
jury's finding equivalent to a "substantial showing," notwithstanding the absence of
supporting record evidence.
Jeffries had argued that more was required under Connick's "stronger showing"
standard than "a simple expectation no matter how reasonable it might be." Plaintiff-
Appellee's Brief at 29-30, Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 93-7876).
Supporting amicus briefs also emphasized this point. One brief urged that under Waters'
"reasonable" investigation standard, university administrators should have been required
to show-as they failed to so do-that they had at least undertaken a "reasonable
investigation into the potential for disruption." Amicus Curiae Brief for the City Uni-
versity of New York University Faculty Senate at 7, Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9 (2d
Cir. 1995) (No. 93-7876). "lit is not sufficient that the employer show a speculative
undifferentiated fear of possible harmful consequences." Id. See also Amicus Curiae Brief
for the Individual Rights Foundation at 2, Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995)
(No. 93-7876) (arguing that under Waters, a "reasonable manager's" determination as to
potential disruption should be subject to strict scrutiny review).
296. Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at 13 (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying note
200.
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for speech,297 Waters made no such distinction. In fact, Waters referred
to punishing speech on public matters that is "likely to be disrup-
tive. 1298 Waters did not even hint that agency superiors could avoid
liability under Pickering by acting only to prevent predicted disruption.
Whether defendants acted with malicious motivation may be relevant
to the issue of punitive damages;299 lack of malicious motivation or
punitive animus, however, has never permitted Pickering defendants to
escape liability for violating an employee's First Amendment speech
rights.300 The critical issue articulated by the Supreme Court in Mt.
Healthy is whether the employee's speech was a substantial or moti-
vating factor prompting agency superiors' adverse personnel action. 301
The jury found both that Jeffries' Albany speech "was a substantial or
motivating factor" underlying CUNY defendants' action shortening his
term as chairman, and that the defendants would not have so acted
had he not made this speech. The district court "made an independent
review of the evidence" and agreed with "the jury's factual findings.' '302
The Second Circuit panel in Jeffries II did not hold that these findings
were "clearly erroneous." The panel simply ignored them, relying
instead on its own novel distinction between retaliation and preventing
disruption. Perhaps the panel misread Waters' "good faith" language303
to mean that the First Amendment would not be offended if agency
superiors' adverse personnel decisions were grounded on good inten-
tions. Waters' "good faith" doctrine, however, applied only to agency
superiors' determinations as to what an employee said when that issue
was in doubt.304 There was no such doubt as to Jeffries' speech.
Moreover, the panel failed to indicate how demoting Jeffries would
have prevented predicted disruption.305 None of the Jeffries opinions
suggest that the defendants even attempted to show that Jeffries' de-
motion could or would have had that effect. Absent such a showing,
it is difficult to see how the defendants seriously could contend that
their action was motivated by a concern to prevent future disruption.
The speech had already been given. At most, defendants might have
argued that punishing Jeffries might prevent tenure disruption.
297. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
298. Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994).
299. See supra text accompanying notes 252-53.
300. Nothing in Pickering, Mt. Healthy, Givhan, Connick, Rankin, or Waters suggests
that the respective defendants in those cases had acted with malicious intent, or that
they could have avoided liability by showing that they had not so acted.
301. See supra text accompanying note 96.
302. Jeffries v. Harleston, 820 F. Supp. 741, 742, 743 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
303. See supra text accompanying note 192.
304. See supra text accompanying note 192.
305. University officials did not demote Jeffries until several months after the Albany
speech. Jeffries 1, 21 F.2d at 1242-43. Evidently they did not believe CUNY's interests
to have been in imminent peril. There had been no jury finding that CUNY officials had
acted to prevent disruption. See supra text accompanying note 228. The district court
characterized their action as "retaliation." Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1088, 1092.
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Under Pickering analysis, a claim that agency superiors acted to
prevent disruption should be considered in connection with the agen-
cy's interests in suppressing the employee's speech, and then weighed
against the speaker's (if not also the public's) interests in his speech.
Even if university officials acted to prevent disruption, however, that
interest would not necessarily prevail on Pickering balancing. Pickering
requires that courts actually identify and weigh the respective "inter-
ests." Pickering does not simply presume that an employee's speech is
of mere nominal importance, and neither Pickering nor any of its
Supreme Court progeny hold that superiors' asserted concerns as to
potential disruption inevitably should or will prevail in Pickering bal-
ancing.
30 6
5. Lack of Causation
Based on jury findings, the Jeffries II court concluded that while six
of the defendants voted to demote Jeffries in retaliation for his speech,
the other nine "based their votes on a reasonable expectation of harm"
to the University. 3 7 "Thus," the panel concluded, "the motives of the
defendants-whatever they were-did not cause a cognizable injury to
Jeffries. "30 8 It already has been observed that malicious motivation is
irrelevant in Pickering causation analysis.309 By saying that Jeffries'
claim failed on the basis of "elemental principles of causation," the
panel seemed to mean simply that he had failed to prove-as required
by Mt. Healthy-that his speech was a "motivating factor" underlying
the Board majority's decision.310
However, if the Jeffries II panel meant that Jeffries had failed to prove
first-level Mt. Healthy causation, it is unclear why the panel also
undertook any Pickering balancing. Failure to show that the defendants
had been actuated by Jeffries' speech should have been dispositive. The
critical issue articulated by the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy, however,
is whether the employee's speech was a substantial or motivating factor
prompting agency superiors' adverse personnel action.31' The jury had
found that Jeffries' speech was a "substantial or motivating factor" in
the defendants' decision to depose Jeffries,312 and the Jeffries II panel
306. See United States v. National Treasury Employees' Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1020,
1021 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Our cases do not
support the notion that the bare assertion of a laudable purpose justifies wide-ranging
intrusions on First Amendment liberties.").
307. Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at 13-14.
308. Id. at 14.
309. See supra notes 297-304 and accompanying text.
310. See supra text accompanying note 96. The district court had accepted the jury's
finding that the Albany speech was a "substantial or motivating factor" underlying
defendants' decision. See supra text accompanying notes 227-29. The circuit court did
not hold that finding clearly erroneous.
311. See supra text accompanying note 96.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 227-29.
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did not dispute this finding. It therefore remains unclear what the panel
meant by "elementary principles of causation" in the context of Pick-
ering analysis.
6. Academic Freedom and the Classroom
Although the court cited to and quoted Keyishian's recognition of
academic freedom as "an important First Amendment concern, ' ' 3 3 the
court's explanation for concluding that Jeffries' academic freedom had
not been adversely affected is inconsistent with both earlier Supreme
Court case law and applicable professional standards. The relevance of
the extent of Jeffries' "public contact" with respect to the academic
freedom issue is not apparent. The court correctly observed that by
demoting Jeffries, defendants did not seek to "silence him or otherwise
limit his access to the 'marketplace of ideas' in the classroom. 31 4
Academic freedom, however, extends well beyond the classroom. 315 It
is obvious that the demotion was meant to, and would "chill" both
Jeffries' academic free speech and that of others who otherwise might
wish to speak out on matters of academic policy or public affairs.
The new, complicated, if not confused, standards bequeathed by
Jeffries II to courts within Second Circuit appellate jurisdiction would
313. Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at 14; see supra text accompanying notes 29-39.
314. Jeffries II, 52 F.3d at 14-15 (emphasis added) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 588, 603., 87 S. Ct. 675, 683-84 (1967)). The CUNY Faculty Senate's
Amicus Brief quoted Keyishian's characterization of the classroom as "the 'marketplace
of ideas,' " but did not refer the court to specific Supreme Court cases or language
extending First Amendment academic freedom to extra-mural speech. Instead, it urged
the court to analogize Jeffries' speech and its content to Pickering's, which likewise took
place outside the institution. CUNY Faculty Senate Amicus Brief, supra note 295, at 6.
315. See supra note 53 and text accompanying notes 22-26, 33-39 & 44-47. See also
discussion of case law in Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 883 F. Supp. 1407,
1412-14 (C.D. Cal. 1995). See also CUNY Faculty Senate Amicus Brief, supra note 295.
This brief argued that Connick and Waters were inapplicable because of the nature and
mission of academe, and also because of the role of faculty in academic governance. The
brief stated, "To apply Waters v. Churchill to the educational setting would place at
serious risk that exchange of viewpoints and open dialogue which form a cornerstone
for intellectual pursuit, learning and academic freedom." Id. at 1. "[Tlhe mission of the
university is education and is premised on a free flow of ideas. What may be 'disruptive'
speech in other public employment contexts, is an intrinsic part of higher education.
Disagreement, contentious and even angry speech are not disruptive in this setting but
are part of the social fabric of the university. Difference of opinion is not disruption, it
is expected, valued and encouraged." Id. at 3, "The university . . . lives on controversy
and debate both within and outside the classroom." Id. at 6.
Compare Rabban, supra note 49, at 296: "[Flocus on employee harmony may be less
salient in an academic context where debate is expected and even encouraged, than in
other areas of public employment." Rabban cites lower federal court decisions that have
so held. Id. at 297 n.333. Jeffries' own appellate brief, supra note 295, did not raise the
academic freedom issue, cite the Supreme Court's academic freedom cases, or refer to
relevant (e.g., AAUP) professional standards or policy documents. The AAUP did not
file an amicus brief.
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not have emerged had CUNY administrators either disciplined Jeffries
solely on legitimate and constitutional grounds-if such discipline was
appropriate-or else respected and defended his right to speak, while
distancing themselves from his views if they so desired. 3 1r These prob-
lematic standards additionally would not have emerged had the Su-
preme Court not once again granted agency superiors found to have
violated lower echelon employees' First Amendment speech rights yet
another opportunity to escape the consequences of so doing. 317 After
Waters and Jeffries II, academics might still be free to speak out on
matters of public concern; they will do so, however, only at their own
risk.
V. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH CASES APPLIED IN ACADEMIC SETrINGS
By remanding Jeffries II "in light of Waters," the Supreme Court
implied that its general public employee speech case law from Pickering
to Waters was now to apply in college and university settings. How
the various tests and factors developed in this case law were to affect
the Court's earlier conclusions as to the "essentiality" or "transcen-
dent" value of academic freedom,318 the Court did not say. Perhaps it
will do so in reviewing some other case. In the interim, college and
university faculty and administrators and their counsel reasonably may
assume that the Pickering to Waters considerations are now in effect.
Related considerations developed in various circuit courts also may be
important. 31 9 The principal analytical steps and issues are as follows.
A. Qualified Immunity
In both Waters and Jeffries, the circuit courts addressed defendant
superiors' claims to qualified immunity. There is conflict among the
circuits as to when such superiors may invoke qualified immunity. The
critical issue concerns when agency officials violate-or should know
that they may be violating-an employee's First Amendment speech
rights. 320 Moreover, it is unclear when the Eleventh Amendment may
316. See supra notes 242-43 and text accompanying notes 239-51.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 86-101, 112-49, 167-211 & 267-76,
318. See supra text accompanying notes 19-51.
319. Several circuit courts earlier applied Pickering review to college and university
faculty speech. See, e.g., Feldman v. Bahn, 12 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 571 (1994); Colburn v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 973 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1992);
Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821 (6th Cir. 1989); Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 1546 (11th
Cir. 1988); Johnson v. Lincoln Univ., 776 F.2d 443, 452 (3d Cir. 1985); Kelleher v.
Flawn, 761 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1985); Lindsey v. Board of Regents, 607 F.2d 672 (5th
Cir. 1979). See generally Leas & Russo, supra note 211. The present article notes a few
examples, but does not undertake a thorough review of the burgeoning corpus of lower
court public employee and academic speech jurisprudence.
320. In Waters, the Seventh Circuit indicated that superiors would not be entitled to
qualified immunity if employees spoke on matters of public concern. See supra note
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shield officials from individual liability.321 The Supreme Court has yet
to address these questions in the context of either academic freedom
or general public employee speech jurisprudence.322
B. Matters of Public Concern
Although Rankin characterized inquiry on matters of public concern
as "the threshold question, ' '3 23 the Supreme Court has provided little
guidance as to defining "public concern." Pickering said that school
financing was a "matter of legitimate public concern. ' 324 The Court
later stated that racial discrimination was "inherently a matter of public
concern." 325 Connick left it unclear whether speech would be protected
if it related both to public and private concerns or to matters that do
not fit either category. 3 26 Some of Connick's hyperbolic language sug-
gested that employee speech on agency operations is to be treated as
if it relates solely to personal matters and consequently is unprotected. 317
Moreover, notwithstanding Givhan ,328 some lower courts have held that,
in view of Connick, speech might not relate to "public concern" unless
the speaker attempted to bring what she said to public attention.3 29 It
is not surprising that lower courts have expended enormous amounts
of judicial energy trying to decide when speech does and does not
relate to "matters of public concern. 330
185. In Jeffries I, the Second Circuit seemed to say that superiors would not be granted
qualified immunity if they sanctioned employees for speaking on matters of public
concern absent actual disruption. See supra text accompanying note 265. See also
Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879, 886-87 (5th Cir. 1995). Other decisions have held that
superiors would be entitled to qualified immunity unless they could not clearly predict
that they would lose when courts employed the Pickering balancing. See supra note 5,
at 43-48, 55-59; see also Feldman v. Bahn, 12 F.3d 730, 732-34 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 571 (1994). See generally supra, note 5, at 55-59.
In Propst v. Bitzer, 39 F.3d 148, 151-52 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 1400
(1995), the court found defendants entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs had
failed to prove causation. There is some conflict as to whether circumstantial evidence
of causation (or proof as to superiors' motivation) is sufficient to defeat superiors' claim
to qualified immunity. See Tompkins v. Vickers, 26 F.3d 603, 608-09 (5th Cir. 1994)
(reviewing other circuits' cases).
321. See John H. Robinson & Mary Elizabeth Huber, The Law of Higher Education and
the Courts: 1993 in Review, 21 J.C. & U.L. 157, 203-08, 244 (1994).
322. But see supra note 184.
323. See supra text accompanying note 154.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
325. See supra note 136.
326. See note 127 and accompanying text and First Amendment Speech Rights, supra
note 57, at 755-58, 772-97. See also Tompkins v. Vickers, 26 F.2d 603, 606-07 (5th Cir.
1994) (teacher's criticizing cancellation of art program at black junior high school held
matter of public concern).
327. See supra notes 127-32; but see supra notes 133-35.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 102-11.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 135-36. See also Public Employees' Free
Speech, supra note 57, at 262-64.
330. Courts sometimes have attempted to divine the "role" in which the employee
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The circuit courts generally agree that the "public concern" test does
not apply in cases involving public employees' First Amendment free-
dom of association. 331 The "matters of public concern" test likewise
should have no place in First Amendment academic freedom contexts.
College and university faculty necessarily speak and write in and from
a broad range of disciplines, few of which are restricted to public
affairs.332 Moreover, in the United States, faculty traditionally play major
roles in determining institutional internal policies and practices, re-
gardless of whether these are of interest to the larger public.333 It remains
to be seen whether the Supreme Court will consider academic speech
protected only if it relates to "matters of public concern." Broadly
conceived, all academic and professional areas of research, teaching
and learning, as well as academic policy issues in public institutions
of higher learning, may be matters of public concern.3 34
Waters and Jeffries II seemed to regard their respective public em-
ployees' First Amendment free speech rights (or "interests") as mere
nominal values that could and should be outweighed by any actual or
"reasonably" anticipated harm to agency operations. 3 5 Though Pick-
spoke as if that were the critical issue. See First Amendment Speech Rights, supra note
57, at 791-94. Some courts have invoked Connick's odd "going public" test. See supra
text accompanying notes 135-36, and Public Employees' Free Speech, supra note 57, at
262-64. It still is unclear whether speech on both public and private concerns is deemed
protected. See Cliff v. Board of Sch. Commr's, 42 F.3d 403, 409-11 (7th Cir. 1994)
(answer depends on other Connick factors); Schiller v. Moore, 30 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th
Cir. 1994) (principal's speech involving both treated as regarding public concern for
summary judgment review). A few circuits have held that employee expression as to
sexual harassment on the job is of "personal," not public concern. See, e.g., Deremo v.
Watkins, 939 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1991); Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414 (7th Cir.
1987). Several decisions recognize whistle-blower speech as relating to public concern.
See Propst v. Bitzer, 39 F.3d 148, 152 (7th Cir. 1994); Hall v. School Dist., 31 F.3d 183,
192-93 (4th Cir. 1994); Swineford v. Snyder County, 15 F.3d 1258, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994).
Generally, however, courts have a narrow view of the issues about which the public
should be concerned.
Recently the Ninth Circuit held that even "recklessly false statements" by a public
employee "are not per se unprotected by the First Amendment when they substantially
relate to matters of public concern." Johnson v. Multnomah County, 48 F.3d 420, 424
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2616 (1995). The Johnson court noted that the
circuits are divided on this issue. Id, at 423. See Powell v. Gallentine, 992 F.2d 1088,
1091 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding knowingly or recklessly false speech unprotected).
331. Schneider v. Indian River Com. College Found., 875 F.2d 1537, 1543 n.6 (11th
Cir. 1989); see also Hasting v. Bonner, 578 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1978).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 28 & 37. See also Eberhardt v. O'Malley,
17 F.3d 1023, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 1994) (public employee fired for writing a novel need
not show it related to matters of public concern).
333. See, e.g., the several documents listed under "College and University Govern-
ment" in Policy Documents and Reports, supra note 1, at 117-41.
334. See supra notes 18, 24, 28 & 37 and accompanying text, and infra notes 342-43,
347-48 & 357-61 and accompanying text.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 200-04 & 281. Waters, however, insisted that
when a government employee has a "strong interest" in speaking on a matter of public
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ering may have intended the public's interest to be factored in on the
side of employees' speech rights, 3 3 subsequent employee speech cases
seldom include such interests-even when the employees speak on
behalf of improving agency functioning. 3 37 The Supreme Court has yet
to consider whether-in view of its earlier line of academic freedom
cases-faculty academic freedom, a "special concern of the First
Amendment," should be accorded greater weight. Keyishian had rec-
ognized academic freedom as a value of transcendent importance not
only for teachers, but also for society. Presumably that importance
should be included on the side of teachers' own interests in academic
free speech when-or if-Pickering balancing is required.
In a case involving statutory limitations on free speech, the Supreme
Court recently has acknowledged that Pickering balancing must include
the interests of "potential audiences," that is, the public. 33 1 Justice
Stevens' majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer; Justice O'Connor concurred in part and dissented
in part.339 A similar majority of the Court eventually may factor this
kind of consideration into Pickering balancing in cases where a superior
has retaliated ad hoc against public employee speech.
C. Purported Institutional Interest in Academic Freedom Versus
Faculty Academic Free Speech
However, another consideration gradually has emerged in commen-
taries and in cases that could offset the importance of faculty academic
free speech in a Pickering analysis. This is the anomalous theory
developed mainly in Seventh Circuit jurisprudence to the effect that
academic institutions themselves are entitled to "academic freedom"
and that such "institutional academic freedom" can counter-balance or
even trump individual faculty academic freedom.34 0
concern, "the government" might have to make a "substantial showing" of likely
disruption. Moreover, Waters did not address whether agency superiors' "reasonable"
concerns as to future disruption would necessarily outweigh employee speech that "more
substantially" related to matters of public concern. See supra text accompanying notes
286-90.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
337. But see Schiller v. Moore, 30 F.3d 1281, 1284 (loth Cir. 1994) (Pickering balancing
includes "related public interest" in comments along with speaker's own interests);
Swineford v. Snyder County, 15 F.3d 1258, 1272 (3d Cir. 1994) (public's interest included
on side of speaker's interests).
338. United States v. National Treasury Employees' Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1014
(1995). "The [Act's] large-scale disincentive to Government employees' expression ...
imposes a significant burden on the public's right to read and hear what the employees
would otherwise have written and said." Id. at 1015.
339. See supra note 57.
340. This theory has been articulated and somewhat ambiguously advocated by J. Peter
Byrne, Academic Freedom: "A Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J.
251 (1989), and thoughtfully critiqued by David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of
"Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom under the First Amendment, 53
LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 227 (Summer 1990). See also supra note 5, at 16-18, 51-55.
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The seeds of this theory were sown, inadvertently, by Justice Frank-
furter-himself a distinguished academic-in his concurring opinion in
Sweezy, where he cited a document authored by South African scholars,
"The Open University in South Africa. ' '341 This document described
the "atmosphere . . . most conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation" which "[it is the business of a university to provide"-an
"atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a
university:" the freedoms "to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study. ' ' 34 2 The document did not distinguish be-
tween the role of a "university" (or its administration) and that of its
faculty in exercising these "freedoms." Since it was the "business" of
a university "to provide" this atmosphere and these freedoms, it is
likely that the d6cument's authors and Justice Frankfurter meant that
the "open university's" faculty were to enjoy these freedoms. 34 3 Neither
the South African document nor Justice Frankfurter characterized these
"freedoms" as matters of "academic freedom." However, the Sweezy
court itself found that the New Hampshire attorney general's activities
had "unquestionably" invaded Sweezy's "liberties in the areas of
academic freedom and political expression-areas in which government
should be extremely reticent to tread."344 "Government" here, of course,
was the State's administrative branch, not the federal judiciary.
Twenty-one years later, Justice Powell invoked Justice Frankfurter's
summary of these freedoms in his tie-breaking opinion in University of
California Regents v. Bakke,345 where, without comment, he re-labeled
them "academic freedoms."346 According to Powell, a university should
enjoy the "freedom" to make its own judgments as to education,
including the selection of its student body .3 7 Like Justice Frankfurter
in Sweezy, Justice Powell did not say whether such freedom was to be
enjoyed by the abstract "university" or by its faculty. In Bakke, the
medical school's faculty had primary responsibility for planning and
effectuating the admissions policies in question. 34 Whatever its merits,
of course, the South African document invoked as persuasive authority
by Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy and later by Justice Powell in Bakke,
made no claim to construe either academic freedom or First Amendment
341. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1218 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See supra note 28.
342. 354 U.S. at 263, 77 S. Ct. at 1218.
343. Justice Frankfurter may have thought it unnecessary to distinguish between
universities and their faculties because, in the 1950s, college and university faculties
typically had primary authority for making the kinds of decisions here characterized as
the "four freedoms."
344. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250, 77 S. Ct. at 1211.
345. 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
346. Id. at 312, 98 S. Ct. at 2759.
347. Id.
348. 438 U.S. at 273 n.1, 98 S. Ct. at 2739 n.1.
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speech rights of faculties at public colleges and universities in the
United States. Moreover, neither Sweezy nor Bakke involved any claim
by a university administration to any kind of freedom from judicial
review that would entitle the university to override the faculty's aca-
demic freedom. In each case, the courts were referees between the
governmental and individual parties, not themselves "the govern-
ment. ' 349 Justice Powell's passing reference to academic freedom and
his failure to distinguish between a university and its faculty evidently
laid the foundation for subsequent lower court opinions that played the
"academic freedom" of one off against that of the other.
The first of these lower court cases was the Arkansas district court's
1979 decision in Cooper v. Ross. 35 1 In dicta, the Cooper court stated
that the case before it involved "a fundamental tension between the
academic freedom of the individual teacher to be free of restraints from
the university administration, and the academic freedom of the univer-
sity to be free of government, including judicial interference.'' s ' The
Cooper court cited no authority for the proposition that a university
had "the academic freedom to be free of government, including judicial,
interference." Perhaps the court confused "academic freedom" with
the value of institutional autonomy.
Three years after Cooper, the Seventh Circuit addressed the same
theme in Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen.352 The Dow court acknowledged
that case law as to "the standard to be applied where the issue is
academic freedom of the university to be free of governmental intrusion,
as opposed to academic freedom of the individual teacher to be free of
restraints from the university administration," was "surprisingly
sparse. ' 351 It was "sparse," of course, because there was no such case
law or standard. Nevertheless, other Seventh Circuit panels followed
suit.3 54
349. In Bakke, the university medical faculty who had developed the challenged
admissions policy, themselves were part of "the government."
350. 472 F. Supp. 802, 813 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
351. Id. The court observed, "Case law considering the extent to which the First
Amendment and academic freedom protect a teacher's choice of teaching methodology
is surprisingly sparse and the results are not entirely consistent." Id. The court concluded,
however, that it need not reach this issue, because it found that the University of
Arkansas' contentions that it had terminated Cooper's appointment because of inadequate
classroom performance were all pretextual, and that the university had "failed to prove
... that the same non-reappointment decision would not have been made" absent its
clear violation of Cooper's First Amendment rights. Id. at 813, 815.
352. 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982).
353. Id. at 1275.
354. See, e.g., Piarowski v. Illinois Comm. College, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007, 106 S. Ct. 528 (1985) (academic freedom is "equivocal"
since it refers to "both the freedom of the academy" from government interference and
"the freedom of the individual teacher"); Weinstein v. University of Illinois, 811 F.2d
1091, 1097 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987); Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 257 (7th Cir. 1992); Parate
v. Isibor, 868 F.2d. 821, 827 (6th Cir. 1989).
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Justice Stevens may have had the Seventh Circuit line of cases in
mind when he wrote in Regents of the University of Michigan v.
Ewing,3 5 "Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and
uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students ... but
also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision-making by
the academy itself.' '356 He characterized the judicial dilemma as, on the
one hand, "a reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and local
educational institutions," and on the other hand, "our responsibility
to safeguard their academic freedom. '317 Justice Stevens cited Board of
Curators v. Horowitz 35 8 to support the view that federal courts are
unsuited "to evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic
decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public educational
institutions-decisions that require 'an expert evaluation of cumulative
information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of
judicial or administrative decision-making.' "3 He then concluded that
the decision to dismiss Ewing from the medical school program "was
not such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to
demonstrate that the faculty did not exercise professional judgment. '"360
Although, like Justices Frankfurter and Powell, Justice Stevens did not
distinguish clearly between "the university" (or its administration) and
university faculty,361 it is clear that the issue in Ewing was the faculty's
"academic freedom" or "autonomous decision-making" authority.
Whether these ambiguous statements by Justice Powell in Bakke and
Justice Stevens in Ewing mean that the Court has recognized an insti-
tutional claim to "academic freedom" can be debated. Courts should
recognize the importance of protecting university autonomy from po-
litical interference as a "necessary condition for the academic freedom"
of university faculties.362 It is clear, however, that neither Sweezy,
Bakke, nor Ewing concerned a university administration's claim either
to the kind of "academic freedom" or "institutional autonomy" that
might offset or override faculty academic freedom.363
355. 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12, 106 S. Ct. 507, 514 n.12 (1985).
356. The Court had denied certiorari in Piarowski just 10 days before deciding Ewing.
Justice Stevens cited Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy and Powell's opinion in Bakke.
357. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226, 106 S. Ct. at 514.
358. 435 U.S. 78, 48 S. Ct. 948 (1978).
359. Id. at 89-90, 48 S. Ct. at 954-55 (emphasis added).
360. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 227, 106 S. Ct. at 514 (emphasis added).
361. See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 278, 102 S. Ct. 269, 279 (1981)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to "the academic freedom of public universities").
362. Rabban, supra note 340, at 229.
363. "[lilt perverts the first amendment and the concept of a bill of rights to subordinate
individual academic freedom to broad institutional autonomy [immune] from judicial
review." Rabban, supra note 340, at 300. See generally id. at 280. Rabban notes that
cases and commentators disagree as to the proper scope of faculty academic freedom; he
also suggests that the protections afforded by academic freedom and by the First Amend-
ment are not, and should not be identical. Id. See also William W. Van Alstyne, The
Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil Liberty, in Edmund
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D. Interference with Efficiency of Performance of Public Services
In the Supreme Court's cases from Pickering to Waters, agency su-
periors chose to discharge subordinates whose speech they found ob-
jectionable, rather than to apply less intrusive sanctions. In every case
except Mt. Healthy and Rankin, the reported facts can be read to
suggest that the superiors wished to get rid of employees who expressed
serious concerns as to how the agencies might function more effectively
or professionally. The Supreme Court has not distinguished carefully
between agency superiors' personal interests in their status and gov-
ernmental (and public) interests in agency efficiency.
Pickering and Rankin indicated that in order to outweigh an employ-
ee's speech right, agency superiors would have to show actual harm
to the agency's performance of services to the public. 364 Connick, on
the other hand, seemed to say that interference with such abstractions
as "discipline," "authority," and "office routine" would negate a
speaker's First Amendment interests. 36 5 Connick also held that agency
superiors' "reasonable" expectations that an employee's speech would
have some such future effect could sometimes outweigh the value of
employee speech.366 Waters stated that the Court "consistently [had]
given greater deference to government predictions of harm used to
justify restrictions of employee speech than to predictions of harm used
to justify restrictions of the speech of the public at large.' '367 The Waters
court implied that, as Connick had indicated, such predictions must be
"reasonable," and therefore were subject to judicial scrutiny. 36 8 Jeffries
L. Pincotts, ed., The Concept of Academic Freedom 59 (1972); and Mark G. Yudof,
Intramural Musings on Academic Freedom: A Reply to Professor Finkin, 66 TEX. L. REv.
1351 (1988).
364. See supra text accompanying notes 67 & 162-63.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 132 & 145.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
367. Waters v. Churchill 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887 (1994). The only prior Supreme Court
case on point, however, was Connick.
368. Waters did not say what kind of justification or level of scrutiny would be
required to establish the reasonableness of such predictions. Justice O'Connor, who wrote
the Court's plurality opinion in Waters, recently stated that there are limits to such
deference: "As the magnitude of intrusion on employees' interests rises, so does the
Government's burden of justification." United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union,
115 S. Ct. 1003, 1021 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part)
(citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-52, 103 S. Ct. at 1692). See supra note 57. She went
on to point out that the Waters plurality had observed that in instances where an
employee's speech dealt directly with matters of public concern, " 'the government may
have to make a substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive
before it may be punished.' " Treasury Employee's Union, 115 S. Ct. at 1021 (citing
Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1887). Justice O'Connor did not explain the difference between
"the magnitude of intrusion on employees' interests" and the Connick criterion, which
seemed to address the extent to which employee speech relates to matters of public
concern.
The "magnitude" of the "intrusion on employees' interests" appears to be a relevant
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II added that officials at an academic institution who claimed they
reasonably predicted "harm" to the institution (even though they had
made no effort to determine whether such harm was likely to occur)
would prevail in Pickering balancing even when the faculty member's
speech might be of the greatest public concern. 369
E. Causation: Basic and "But For" Mount Healthy Tests
The Supreme Court cases require that a public employee who claims
that her speech rights were violated must show that her superiors'
adverse action was based at least in part on her speech.3 70 Under Waters,
public agency superiors can punish an employee not for what she
actually said, but for what the superiors believed she said, provided
such belief was grounded on a "reasonable investigation" as to the
speech's content. In academic contexts, state law, implementing regu-
lations, collective bargaining agreements or other contracts, and tradi-
tional academic due process 371 may require more thorough fact-finding
procedures, including notice and hearings.
Jeffries II implied that if university officials "discipline" a faculty
member because they "reasonably" anticipate that his speech would
be "disruptive," rather than "in retaliation" for speaking, there is no
First Amendment violation. Under these circumstances, public employ-
ees, including academics, would confront yet another hurdle if they
consideration, akin to the question of whether the government's restriction is narrowly
tailored to serve its legitimate interests. In Pickering, the Court flagged the relevance of
this kind of consideration: "The Board could easily have rebutted appellant's errors by
publishing the accurate figures itself, either via a letter to the same newspaper or
otherwise." Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1736 (1968).
Obviously an employee's interests are affected more substantially when she is fired than,
for instance, formally reprimanded, warned or even temporarily suspended without pay.
Perhaps the Court will consider "the magnitude of intrusion on employees' interests"
in future cases involving ad hoc retaliation. At any rate, it may be significant that Justice
O'Connor and five other present Justices were willing to find that government employees'
First Amendment speech interests could outweigh statutory restrictions based on only
speculative prediction of harm to agency efficiency interests. See also Schiller v. Moore,
30 F.3d 1281, 1284 (loth Cir. 1994) (after Waters, agency superiors must still show
"reasonable" conclusions as to speech's "actual consequences," not just subjective
perception of harm).
369. See supra text accompanying notes 277-81. See contra Trotman v. Board of
Trustees, 635 F.2d 216, 230 (3d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted) ("In an academic environ-
ment, suppression of speech or opinion cannot be justified by an 'undifferentiated fear
or apprehension of disturbance,' nor by 'a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.' Instead, restraint on
such protected activity can be sustained only upon a showing that such activity would
'materially and substantially interfere with the requirement of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school.' ").
370. See, e.g., Hanton v. Gilbert, 36 F.3d 4, 6-7 (4th Cir. 1994); Blum v. Schlegel, 18
F.3d 1005, 1112-14 (2d Cir. 1994); Cromley v. Board of Educ., 17 F.3d 1059, 1067-69
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 74 (1994).
371. See, e.g., statements in Policy Documents and Reports, supra note 1, at 11-31.
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wished to vindicate their free speech right. These employees would
have to show not only that their speech was a "substantial or motivating
factor" prompting their superiors' adverse actions; they also would
have either to prove that the superiors' action had been taken in
retaliation for their speech, or to rebut the superiors' contention that
they had acted only "on a reasonable expectation of harm. ' '3 72 Doing
so could be a formidable task, especially if, as in Jeffries II, agency
superior-defendants would not be required to show how their actions
were even broadly tailored to avert agency harm. This retaliation/
prevent-disruption distinction however, ignores Supreme Court juris-
prudence regarding employees' and teachers' right to speak on matters
of public concern. The purpose of Pickering "balancing" is to weigh
the values associated with the employee's First Amendment speech
interests against the extent of possible harm or "disruption" caused by
that speech to an agency's performance of public services. 373 Nor did
the Court's academic freedom cases make any allowance for sanctioning
speech because of anticipated "disruption. ' 374 Controversial speech
always has the potential to prompt adverse public or institutional
reaction. The proposed "prevent-disruption" /"retaliation" distinction
appears aberrational and unworkable, and unlikely to withstand further
judicial scrutiny.
Finally, after a teacher or other public employee has prevailed in all
other stages of Pickering analysis, and the court has found that her
First Amendment speech rights have been violated, her superiors can
still try to show that they would have taken exactly the same adverse
personnel action in the absence of, or "but for," her speech. This is
the Mt. Healthy second chance causation step. 375 If college or university
administrators can make this showing, judicial economy would better
be served if they did so early in the trial. Both parties could thereby
be spared the time and expense of trial on other stages of Pickering
proof. However, if administrators can make such a legitimate showing,
they also should have been able to act on permissible grounds in the
first place.376 Administrators should consider the Jeffries district court's
admonitions on this point. 377
By the same token, public college and university faculty who wish
to report findings or express views on controversial topics should
372. Jeffries II did not indicate which party would bear the burden of proof on this
question.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 58-84.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 13-53.
375. See supra text accompanying notes 90-101. Litigation on this issue can consume
considerable judicial energy. See, e.g., Gooden v. Neal, 17 F.3d 925, 935 (7th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 73 (1994).
376. See Johnson v. Lincoln Univ., 776 F.2d 443, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that
at trial, defendants must show "by a preponderance of the evidence not that they could
have terminated [the faculty member], but that they would" have done so).
377. See supra notes 242-43 and text accompanying notes 237-51.
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observe appropriate professional standards concerning speech and other
on- and off-campus activities. 378 For example, faculty members should
meet their basic obligations and responsibilities, and avoid engaging
in unnecessary "personalities," profane or offensive speech, and scan-
dalous or unlawful conduct. Academic freedom never meant "anything
goes. ' 379
VI. CONCLUSION
Taken together, the Supreme Court public employee speech cases
from Pickering to Waters, if applied to academic freedom litigation,
would impose severe restrictions on traditional and legitimate profes-
sional speech by faculty at public colleges and universities. These
restrictions should concern administrators at such institutions, since
the restrictions would hamper faculties' ability to teach, share research
findings, and engage in public service when doing so might prompt
adverse public or political reactions. Such restrictions, as the Court
itself earlier warned, also would ill-serve the interests of the public
and the nation. 38 0 The implications of the Court's remand of Jeffries II
"in light of Waters" remain unclear. While in theory, public college
and university faculty are no longer in the shoes of Holmes' police-
man, 38 1 by invoking its line of general public employee speech juris-
prudence in remanding Jeffries 1,382 the Supreme Court sent a chilling
breeze down the halls of academe. The Court declined to consider
whether this was the message it really intended when it decided to
deny Jeffries' petition for writ of certiorari. 383
Pending further treatment of these issues by the Supreme Court or
the courts of appeals having jurisdiction, college and university attor-
neys should consider additional issues that have surfaced in the Pick-
ering line of cases, particularly in Waters and Jeffries, and other lower
court decisions. Some of these issues also may be of interest to public
college and university faculty and their counsel.
At the outset, it is important to note that in public employee speech
jurisprudence, there is no clearly established boundary between de
minimis and actionable violations. Obviously, retaliatory dismissal,
revocation or denial of tenure, demotion, or temporary suspension
without pay can give rise to a cause of action. 384 Involuntary transfer
378. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text; see also various statements on
professional ethics in Policy Documents and Reports, supra note 1, at 73-85.
379. See Leas & Russo, supra note 211. See also supra text accompanying notes 249-
50.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 15, 18, 24, 28 & 33-37.
381. See note 56 & accompanying text.
382. See Harleston v. Jeffries, 115 S. Ct. 502, 503 (1994).
383. See Hiers, supra note *.
384. See Hiers, supra note 5, at 49-51.
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of tenured faculty from one department to another similarly can do
so. 3815 Even placing a letter of reprimand in an employee-speaker's
personnel file can constitute a First Amendment violation.386 Denying
summer employment or salary increases, however, may not be viola-
tions. 38 7 To avoid the expenses of litigation and attendant unfavorable
publicity for the institution, academic counsel should advise adminis-
trators at all levels, including department chairs, regarding the basic
outlines of faculty academic and First Amendment free speech rights.
Administrators should be asked to consult with counsel before taking
any adverse personnel action in response to faculty expression, whether
written or oral. Unless the speech in question is reasonably likely to
pose some imminent risk of harm to institutional operations, adminis-
trators should simply ask (or warn) the faculty speaker to refrain from
such speech in the future. Such a warning, however, is appropriate
only when the speech presents some real likelihood of actual interfer-
ence with the academic enterprise, not simply when the administrators'
feelings are hurt.388 Academic administrators generally have learned
that tolerating faculty dissent and even pointed criticism "goes with
the turf" and actually enhances their standing with faculty. When
administrators seriously disagree with what they consider erroneous or
misguided public statements by faculty, they are certainly at liberty to
set the public record straight, as Pickering recommended; such disa-
greement, however, does not give license to punish the speaker.389
"Firing" or terminating a faculty member's employment because of her
speech should be considered only as a last resort; this ultimate sanction
is more likely to result in litigation, as well as scrutiny and censure
by the AAUP or other professional or accrediting associations.
When administrators believe termination or other severe sanctions
are appropriate, counsel will, of course, need to review the various
elements in current academic freedom and First Amendment speech
jurisprudence. If there is any question as to what the faculty or other
employee-speaker actually said, Waters teaches the importance of a
well-documented "reasonable investigation" as well as some basis for
showing that the administrators involved actually and in good faith
believed that the faculty/employee really said what the investigation
385. Maples v Martin, 858 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1988).
386. See Hiers, supra note 5, at 50 n.245. Unless kept confidential, such a letter may
also give rise to action for defamation. State public records laws may add to this risk.
387. See id. at 50 n.246.
388. Pickering indicates that speech that merely offends higher officials may not be
protected. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
389. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1736 (1968).
The Jeffries defendants issued press releases to the media; instead, however, of repudiating
the content of Jeffries' speech while defending the importance of academic free speech,
these releases condemned Jeffries and intimated that CUNY officials were proceeding to
review his statements in order to punish him for making them. Jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at
1242.
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concluded she had said.390 For the same reason, faculty who have
reason to believe that their professional but candid comments or criti-
cisms may cause institutional administrators discomfort are well-ad-
vised to keep a record or "paper trail" as to their actual language in
order to correct possible distortions or false rumors. In any case,
administrators should be able to demonstrate either that the speech in
question actually interfered with institutional operations, or that they
reasonably believed it would so interfere. To demonstrate such reason-
able belief, more than mere speculation or assertion is required, even
under the deferential standards established by Connick and Waters.
391
Both Connick and Waters cautioned that in certain circumstances,
especially where agency superiors claimed to have anticipated future
disruption, they would have to bear a heavier "burden" or make a
"stronger" or "more substantial" showing. 392
At this point in Supreme Court jurisprudence, it remains uncertain
how the Court's lines of academic freedom and general public employee
speech case law will intersect. As has been suggested,'3 3 the Court may
eventually assign academic free speech the kind of weight in Pickering
balancing appropriate to the importance accorded such speech in Sweezy,
Keyishian, and Whitehead. 39 4 These cases recognized faculty academic
freedom as an important value not only for faculty, but also, and
particularly, for the well-being of academic institutions and the na-
tion. 39 5 Administrators should be cautioned against treading on faculty
academic freedom even lightly.
For these reasons, as well as the standard considerations as to the
costs of litigation and the ordinary risk of losing what looks like a
winning case at trial or on appeal, university attorneys may recom-
mend-even where administrators may have what appears to be a strong
case for termination-that the administrators first attempt to resolve the
problem through less drastic strategies. Such strategies might include
the familiar practice of "counseling out" or offering the equivalent of,
e.g., a year's salary in exchange for a letter of resignation. On the other
hand, where a faculty member, who has received a warning, continues
to engage in genuinely disruptive speech and declines to resign despite
390. See supra text accompanying notes 192-198.
391. See supra notes 138, 143, 202 & 366-68 and accompanying text.
392. See supra note 138 and accompanying text; supra note 202; and supra text
accompanying note 286.
393. See supra text accompanying notes 337-40. See also Cohen v. San Bernardino
Valley College, 883 F. Supp. 1407, 1422 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (suggesting that academic
speech should be accorded greater weight in Pickering balancing).
394. See supra text accompanying notes 29-48.
395. In this connection, it may be significant that in the Court's latest Pickering
opinion-albeit in the line of statutory cases-a majority recognized that Pickering
balancing should include the interests of "potential audiences" and "the public's right
to read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said." United
States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 1014-15 (1995).
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reasonable incentives to do so, counsel should not hesitate to recom-
mend termination, even for tenured faculty members . 3 9  Faculty, ad-
ministrators and their respective counsel should bear in mind that
speech "so without foundation as to call into question" a faculty
member's academic competence can be the basis for appropriate per-
sonnel action without necessarily implicating the First Amendment. 31 7
Jeffries has yet a final lesson for both administrations and faculty.
Litigation before the district court spanned several months and resulted
in four separate published decisions; the case twice came before the
Court of Appeals; and it was considered twice by the Supreme Court
on petitions for certiorari. The costs of litigation suggest that there
should be a better way to resolve such controversies. For example,
university administrators and faculty might recognize and agree that
academic freedom is too important to be left to the courts. Protecting
academic free speech-by faculty and administrative personnel-is in
the interest of the institutional mission as well as the public and the
nation. Administrators, faculty, and their respective institutions un-
doubtedly can benefit from agreeing upon standards and procedures
that can assure optimal freedom of expression and at the same time
avoid adverse effects on institutional functioning. Suggested guidelines
have been developed and endorsed by major academic and professional
associations. 398 Such standards and procedures can be agreed to con-
tractually, as well as established by state laws and institutional regu-
lations. Most public college and university officials appreciate the value
of such guidelines. Where both administrative officials and faculty can
point to commonly accepted standards and procedures, courts will be
much more likely to honor them and strike a proper balance between
administrators' and faculties' common interests in academic freedom
and in the institution's effective performance of its educational mission.
Faced with potential political pressures resulting from media attention
to Jeffries' Albany speech, CUNY officials probably were tempted to
appease their critics by punishing the professor. Administrators more
strongly committed to the values of First Amendment free speech and
academic freedom, instead, could have made some effort to explain to
396. Notwithstanding popular superstition, tenure does not accord a lifetime guarantee
of continuing employment. It does mean that administrators who wish to terminate a
tenured faculty member's appointment have the burden of showing good cause for so
doing. Tenured faculty are not "at will" employees. In addition, since Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972), a tenured faculty member (unlike her
untenured colleague) is deemed to have a property (but not a liberty) interest in her
continuing employment, of which she may be deprived only pursuant to adequate intra-
institutional due process. As to the interplay between academic freedom and tenure
generally, see Ralph S. Brown & Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and Academic
Freedom, 53 LAw & CoNTEmP. PRoas. 325 (Summer 1990); and Matthew W. Finkin, "A
Higher Order of Liberty in the Workplace": Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Vortex
of Employment Practices and Law, 53 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoas. 357 (Summer 1990).
397. See supra text accompanying notes 78, 98-100 & 250.
398. See Policy Documents and Reports, supra note 1.
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CUNY alumni, friends, donors, state and city political leaders, and the
public at large why academic freedom is essential to the academic
enterprise and the public good. In doing so, of course, they would
have had to undertake to educate the larger community as to the critical
distinction between disagreeing with obnoxious and even erroneous
views on the one hand, and defending the right of a faculty member
to express such ideas in the public "marketplace" on the other. Such
an undertaking is within the capacity of the leaders of major educational
institutions.

